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INTRODUCTION
The 2008 presidential campaign is in full swing, and the future of the
Supreme Court has become a top concern for candidates and voters. Five
of the Court’s nine members will be over the age of seventy by January
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2009,1 and there is widespread speculation that the next President will have
the opportunity to replace one or more of them.2 Candidates on both sides
of the aisle recognize the stakes. Republican presidential candidate John
McCain has promised to select judicial nominees who are “clones” of Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito.3 Democratic frontrunner Barack Obama
says “[w]e need [a Supreme Court nominee] who’s got the heart, the empathy, to recognize what it’s like to be a young teenage mom. The empathy to
understand what it’s like to be poor, or African-American, or gay, or disabled, or old.”4 Voters are paying attention. In an August 2007 poll, 52%
of registered voters reported that “the appointment of Supreme Court Justices” would be “very important” to their vote for President in 2008, and
88% reported that Supreme Court appointments would be at least “somewhat important.”5
With impeccable timing comes Christopher Eisgruber’s The Next Justice: Repairing the Supreme Court Appointments Process.6 Written by a
law professor but aimed at a general audience,7 The Next Justice roughly
fits the mold of Stephen Carter’s The Confirmation Mess8 and Laurence
Tribe’s God Save This Honorable Court9 in critically evaluating the selection process for Supreme Court Justices and offering a program for reform.
Eisgruber’s book enters a crowded but important field. The essential
elements of the appointments process, set out in Article II, Section 2 of the
1

Steven G. Calabresi & John O. McGinnis, McCain and the Supreme Court, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 4, 2008, at A14; see Supreme Court of the United States, The Justices of the Supreme Court,
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited July 25, 2008).
2
See, e.g., Douglas W. Kmiec, Justice Clinton?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2007, at A13 (“[I]t is widely
anticipated that there will be one or more vacancies on the Supreme Court during the next presidential
term.”); Posting of Tom Goldstein to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/uncategorized/thenext-supreme-court-justice/ (Dec. 21, 2007, 3:22 p.m.) (agreeing that “[t]he next president is likely to
make several Supreme Court appointments” and speculating about which Justices may retire).
3
Jim Galloway, Countdown 2008: Senators Back McCain, Open Rift, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 3,
2008, at C1 (reporting on an Atlanta campaign rally where McCain promised, “I will try to find clones
of [Justice Samuel] Alito and [Chief Justice John] Roberts”).
4
Posting of Carrie Dann to First Read, http://firstread.msnbc.msn.com/archive/2007/07/17/
274143.aspx (July 17, 2007, 4:21 p.m.).
5
Press Release, Qunnipiac Univ. Polling Inst., Voters Back Supreme Court Limit on School Deseg
3–1, at 5 (Aug. 16, 2007), available at http://www.quinnipiac.edu/images/polling/us/us08162007.doc.
Just 11% of registered voters consider the appointment of Supreme Court Justices “not important at all”
to their votes. Id.
6
CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, THE NEXT JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (2007).
7
Id. at x (lamenting the lack of understanding of judicial decisionmaking in “American public debate” and explaining that the goal of the book is to help the American public to “understand better how
the Court operates”). Eisgruber was previously a law professor at New York University School of Law
but now serves as the provost of Princeton University.
8
STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS
PROCESS (1994).
9
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT (1985).
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Constitution, are unchanged since the Founding: the President “by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the supreme Court.”10 For a variety of structural, external, and judicial reasons,
however, the politics of federal judicial appointments have fundamentally
changed in the last eighty years, especially since the 1980s.11 Today, for the
Supreme Court and United States circuit courts of appeals, the appointments process is high-stakes, explosively partisan, and often nasty.12 Commentators have called for the abandonment of Senate confirmation
hearings,13 the direct election of Justices,14 a more assertive and independent
role for the Senate in pre-approving and rejecting nominees,15 a two-thirds
supermajority requirement for Senate confirmation,16 and a host of other
changes.17 Eisgruber, like his predecessors, seeks a more honest and informed method of filling vacancies on the Supreme Court.18
His argument only partly succeeds. The Next Justice is a thoughtprovoking and original essay about Supreme Court judging trapped in an
unconvincing book about Court reform. Eisgruber is at his best as he dissects and counters two popular narratives about the way Supreme Court
Justices decide cases: one that treats Justices as neutral and nonpolitical
“umpires,” and another that views Justices as pervasively ideological “politicians” in robes.19 Those insights make The Next Justice a worthy read in
spite of the book’s weaknesses, including an unrealistic and likely ineffective package of reforms.
Eisgruber’s two-part reform package urges the Senate to confirm only
“moderate” Justices. First, at the confirmation hearings, he proposes that
10

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
See David R. Stras, Understanding the New Politics of Judicial Appointments, 86 TEX. L. REV.
1033, 1057–72 (2008).
12
See id. at 1072–78.
13
BENJAMIN WITTES, CONFIRMATION WARS 13–14 (2006).
14
RICHARD DAVIS, ELECTING JUSTICE: FIXING THE SUPREME COURT NOMINATION PROCESS
170–78 (2005).
15
Michael J. Gerhardt, Divided Justice: A Commentary on the Nomination and Confirmation of
Justice Thomas, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 969, 992 (1992); David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The
Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491, 1512 (1992).
16
Gary J. Simson, Thomas’s Supreme Unfitness—A Letter to the Senate on Advise and Consent,
78 CORNELL L. REV. 619, 649–51 (1993).
17
See, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, If the Judicial Confirmation Process is Broken, Can a Statute
Fix It?, 85 NEB. L. REV. 960, 960 (2007) (advocating statutory reform of the confirmation process);
Tom Lininger, On Dworkin and Borkin’, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1315, 1328–29 (2007) (proposing a package of reforms that includes revisions to the ABA’s code of judicial ethics); Richard D. Manoloff, The
Advice and Consent of the Congress: Toward a Supreme Court Appointment Process for Our Time,
54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1087, 1105 (1993) (proposing that the House of Representatives assume a role in the
appointments process).
18
Eisgruber addresses only in passing the substantial developments in the appointments process for
nominees to the federal circuit courts, where much of the delay, acrimony, and obstruction has taken
place in recent years.
19
EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 7.
11
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senators ask questions designed to uncover extremism.20 Second, if senators
are not satisfied that a nominee is a moderate, they should reject the nomination.21 Put another way, Eisgruber wants the Senate to “get smart” and to
“get tough,” asking more intelligent and probing questions about judicial
philosophy at the hearings, and then boldly rejecting any nominee who is
not demonstrably moderate.
Unfortunately, Eisgruber’s proposals are riddled with problems. His
definition of a moderate is supposed to appeal to the political center, but its
details are noticeably left-leaning. He also fails to properly diagnose the
problems with the appointments process and to account for current political
realities in his reform package. In particular, his proposals for reforming
confirmation hearings are unlikely to succeed because they depend on senators’ willingness to overcome intense political pressure from interest groups
and the media. In the past, senators have been unable to do so despite the
high stakes of Supreme Court appointments.
But the most serious flaw in Eisgruber’s program for reform, and in
similar proposals that rely on a “get tough” approach by the Senate, is a
failure to account for the institutional strength of the President. As we demonstrate in Part II, drawing on a rich body of political science literature,
Presidents have an impressive set of tools at their disposal to counter even
the most aggressive action by the Senate. The most basic and powerful tool
is the strategic selection of nominees, especially nominees with excellent
qualifications, which can make it difficult for senators of the opposition
party to block a nomination. Strategic selection is especially important in
periods of divided government between the political parties. In addition,
Presidents can improve the odds of confirmation by “going public” and
touting the qualifications and attributes of their nominees. They can also
counter Senate inaction or obstruction on nominees by making recess appointments and by employing ordinary legislative techniques like logrolling
strategies, credible veto threats, and the offer of incentives to encourage recalcitrant senators to support a nominee. Strategic employment of these
tools makes it difficult for senators, especially those of the President’s
party, to obstruct Supreme Court nominees.
This Review Essay proceeds in two parts. Part I reviews The Next Justice, evaluating both its novel account of how Supreme Court Justices decide cases and its disappointing call for reform. Part II focuses on the role
of the President in judicial appointments and describes the surprisingly
strong and varied set of tools at the President’s disposal.

20
21

Id. at 187.
Id. at 183.
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I.

AN IMMODERATE PROPOSAL

A. The Job Description of a Supreme Court Justice
The Next Justice advertises itself as a plan for “repairing the Supreme
Court appointments process,”22 but it would be a mistake to classify The
Next Justice in the policy reform genre. “The book’s heart,” Eisgruber explains, is an argument about how Supreme Court Justices decide cases,
which has implications for the kind of Justices Americans should prefer.23
Just as a good manager must understand the job description before hiring an
employee, Americans “must have a clear understanding of what Supreme
Court justices do”—specifically, how they decide politically controversial
cases—to know what kind of individuals should be nominated and confirmed.24
That starting point, Eisgruber recognizes, is “unusual.”25 He notes that
“[m]any books examine the appointment of Supreme Court justices, and
many discuss how the Supreme Court should decide cases, but almost none
connect the two subjects.”26 To correct this “damaging mistake,”27 Eisgruber dedicates almost all of his attention to an analytical model of Supreme
Court decisionmaking, only briefly articulating and defending a package of
reforms.28 We turn to those reforms below, but we begin by discussing Eisgruber’s job description for a Supreme Court Justice.
1. Judges as Umpires, Judges as Politicians.—In interviews, Eisgruber has explained that he wrote The Next Justice because he was “disappointed with the quality of the Roberts and Alito hearings” and, in
particular, with Chief Justice Roberts’s description of Justices as “umpires.”29 The book begins with a description of that episode:
When John Roberts addressed the Senate at his confirmation hearings, he
declared that judges, including Supreme Court justices, are like umpires.
“Umpires don’t make the rules; they apply them,” Roberts testified. “I come
before the committee with no agenda. I have no platform. Judges are not politicians[.]” . . .
Roberts has proven to be an odd sort of umpire. In contested cases during
his first term as chief justice, Roberts consistently voted with the Court’s conservatives and against its liberals. In cases settled by a divided vote, Roberts
22

Id. at iii.
Id. at xi.
24
Id. at 6.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 164–92.
29
Posting of Jason Harrow to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/uncategorized/ask-theauthor-christopher-eisgruber-and-the-next-justice-part-i/ (Nov. 14, 2007, 10:11 a.m.).
23
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agreed with the Court’s best-known conservative, Antonin Scalia, 77.5 percent
of the time, and he voted with John Paul Stevens, commonly regarded as the
Court’s most liberal member, only 35 percent of the time. . . . [Roberts’s] umpiring turned out to have a decidedly conservative slant.30

Eisgruber makes the same point about Clarence Thomas, ridiculing Thomas’s statement to the Senate “that justices ha[ve] to ‘strip down [like] a
runner,’ casting aside their opinions and values, before deciding a case.”31
That claim is “unbelievable” and Thomas’s statements to the Senate are
“patent[ly] inadequa[te],” Eisgruber says, because they are contradicted by
Thomas’s conservative views on social issues and consistently conservative
voting record on the Court.32 Eisgruber also criticizes as “disingenuous[]”
President Reagan’s characterization of Judge Robert Bork, his failed nominee to the Court, “as an ‘even-handed and open-minded’ judge who was
neither a conservative nor a liberal.”33 The Senate properly rejected Bork,
Eisgruber says, because it recognized “that Bork’s judicial philosophy was
extremely conservative.”34
Although Eisgruber plainly faults Roberts, Thomas, and Reagan for
engaging in deception, or perhaps self-delusion, he considers it unremarkable that Supreme Court Justices’ votes fit an ideological pattern.35 Indeed,
his central argument is that Justices have no choice but to vote ideologically. He illustrates the point using the Equal Protection Clause, which
provides that “[n]o state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.”36 To interpret that clause, “[p]resumably
[Justices] must ask what it means for the laws to protect people equally.”37
That question takes the Court “straight to the nerve center of American
30

EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 17 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 182 (second alteration in original); see id. at 145.
32
Id. at 145, 182. Eisgruber does not mention that Thomas borrowed the phrase from Learned
Hand, who praised Justice Benjamin Cardozo as a “runner stripped for the race” in a memorial tribute
written upon Cardozo’s death in 1939. See Learned Hand, Mr. Justice Cardozo, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 9,
11 (1939) (“A wise man is one exempt from the handicap of such a past; he is a runner stripped for the
race . . . .”). As Mary Ann Glendon has observed, it is striking that Thomas’s statement “was pounced
upon and ridiculed in the national press and in law school corridors by people who appeared to have no
idea that Thomas was quoting Hand on Cardozo!” Mary Ann Glendon, A Nation Under Lawyers, Address for the American Enterprise Institute Bradley Lecture Series, Nov. 17, 1994, available at
http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.17996,filter.all/pub_detail.asp. Notably, Justice Breyer made the
same statement during his confirmation hearings several years later. Nomination of Stephen G. Breyer
to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 119 (1995) (describing the ideal judge as “a runner stripped for the race” and
explaining to the Senate that a judge should “interpret the law that applies to everyone, not enunciate a
subjective belief or preference”).
33
EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 153.
34
Id. at 154.
35
Id. at 18.
36
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
37
EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 20.
31
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ideological controversy,” Eisgruber observes, because “[l]iberals and conservatives disagree passionately about what it means for the laws to protect
groups equally, and about when it is appropriate for the laws to treat one
group better than another.”38 The public debates over affirmative action and
same-sex marriage, for example, reflect competing views “about what
equality means.”39 Applying the Equal Protection Clause in these areas is
not as simple as calling balls and strikes, Eisgruber argues, because Justices
“cannot appeal to some uncontroversial standard of equality that exists outside and apart from competing theories about equality.”40 The same difficulty arises in construing other provisions written “in spare and short text”
using “abstract phrases,” including the First and Fourth Amendments.41
Eisgruber contends that, because these constitutional provisions are indeterminate, Justices necessarily must make politically controversial choices
in interpreting them.42
In a chapter entitled “The Incoherence of Judicial Restraint,” Eisgruber
criticizes “strict construction,” “judicial restraint,” and similar “rhetorical
trick[s]” as close cousins of the umpire analogy that “cannot save judges
from the need to make politically controversial judgments.”43 He focuses
most intently, however, on originalism, which he describes as an interpretive strategy that “recommends that when the constitutional text is susceptible of multiple interpretations, judges and other readers should try to figure
out what the framers (or the ratifiers) would have intended for us to do.”44
38

Id.
Id. at 20–21.
40
Id.at 21.
41
Id. at 23–25.
42
Id. at 21.
43
Id. at 32–35.
44
Id. at 35. Anyone familiar with the scholarly debate about originalism will find Eisgruber’s discussion deficient. He describes originalism as a search for “original intent,” ignoring the emergent (and
now arguably dominant) form of originalism that looks to the “original public meaning” of the constitutional text rather than the subjective intentions of the Framers or ratifiers. See Randy E. Barnett, An
Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 620–29 (1999) (describing this method as “the
new originalism”); Bradley P. Jacob, Back to Basics: Constitutional Meaning and “Tradition”, 39 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 261, 268 (2007) (describing “original public meaning textualism” as “[t]he cutting edge
of originalist thinking today”); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the
Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1139 (2003) (describing “original meaning
textualism” as “[t]he latest word” in originalism and a new chapter “in the story of originalism working
itself pure”). Even Keith Whittington, whom Eisgruber praises for offering “[b]y far the most sophisticated and thorough defense” of originalism, EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 35 n.10, has acknowledged a
significant shift in originalist methodology toward original public meaning. See Keith E. Whittington,
The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 609–12 (2004). Most glaringly, Eisgruber characterizes Akhil Amar and Justice Scalia as intentionalists, when both have expressly rejected that approach. Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term—Foreword: The Document and the
Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 29 (2000); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER
OF INTERPRETATION 3, 37–47 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
39

1875

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

That approach “cannot work,” Eisgruber concludes, because of insurmountable methodological problems in determining the original subjective intent
of the Founders.45 Eisgruber also criticizes originalism’s “ideological
slant,” noting that “the most vocal proponents of originalism are conservatives” and charging that originalists reach conclusions at odds with their
own political convictions “between very rarely and never.”46
Just as he rejects the description of Justices as neutral and nonpolitical
“umpires,” Eisgruber rejects a competing narrative of Justices as ideologues—“ordinary politicians”—who systematically translate their political
preferences into judicial decisions.47 Some differences between Justices and
legislators are institutional, according to Eisgruber. He sees a sharp contrast between the method of decisionmaking on the Court and that of Congress, noting that although both bodies must make political choices,
“adjudication does not involve lobbying, jawboning, or bargaining in the
way legislation does.”48 Drawing on his experience as a clerk for Justice
Stevens, Eisgruber reports that “[t]he work done on the Court is more solitary, more scholarly, and more analytic than what is done in the nearby
Senate and House office buildings.”49 Another institutional difference between legislators and Justices is the expectation of impartiality. Justices,
unlike members of Congress, may not participate in cases in which they
have a personal or financial stake.50 Life tenure reinforces the Court’s independence by allowing Justices to make decisions without “worry[ing] about
pleasing voters, patrons, or political parties.”51
As the strongest proof that Justices are not simply politicians in robes,
Eisgruber points to cases in which members of the Court unanimously
agree, even when politicians are divided or would even reach the opposite
result. For example, in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional
Rights, Inc. (FAIR),52 the Court unanimously rejected a First Amendment
challenge to the Solomon Amendment despite staunch political opposition

45

EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 35. Eisgruber’s inattention to methods other than “original intent”
originalism is unfortunate because “original public meaning” originalism emerged largely in response to
the methodological difficulties that Eisgruber identifies. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 552 n.35, 553 (1994); Henry Paul
Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 725 (1988).
46
EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 40–41.
47
Id. at 53.
48
Id. at 52.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 89–90.
51
Id. at 63. See generally David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Retaining Life Tenure: The Case for a
“Golden Parachute”, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1397 (2005) (defending life tenure for Supreme Court Justices
and proposing a package of retirement incentives to discourage Justices from remaining on the Court too
long).
52
547 U.S. 47 (2006).
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to the military’s refusal to hire gay and lesbian attorneys.53 Similarly, in
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,54 the Court
unanimously struck down an ordinance prohibiting the “ritual” killing of
animals,55 even though almost no one in Congress was willing to join an
amicus brief supporting that result, fearing that “electoral opponents could
paint them as sympathetic to animal sacrifice or strange religions.”56 For
Eisgruber, unanimous decisions in politically controversial cases demonstrate that judges are not pervasively ideological in their decisionmaking.57
To explain why Supreme Court Justices do not vote ideologically in
every case, Eisgruber argues that in addition to their political values, Justices hold “procedural” values.58 By procedural values, Eisgruber means
both “small-scale principles,” such as “the right of individuals to receive
advance notice before the government holds a hearing that affects their interests,” and “larger-scale norms,” such as deference to legislatures, fidelity
to precedent, and respect for the findings of administrative agencies.59 He
intends this “conceptual umbrella” to cover a wide range of principles, but
he views the crucial characteristic of a procedural commitment to be its capacity to “generate votes that cross ideological lines.”60 Eisgruber argues,
for example, that the decision in FAIR rested in part on the procedural principle that the Court should defer to Congress when setting policy for the
purpose of raising and supporting armies—a principle that “[t]he liberal justices could support . . . even if they wished Congress had pursued a different policy.”61
Eisgruber has no illusions that Justices always abide by their procedural values. Instead, “process and substance intertwine” and “interact with
one another,” such that a Justice might set aside a procedural value in a particular case for political reasons.62 Justices who have a procedural commitment to stare decisis, for example, may disregard that commitment to
overrule a previous decision they dislike. His point is that procedural values sometimes point in the opposite direction of political values and that

53

Id. at 70. For an overview of the political and legal controversy, see Anita J. Fitch, The Solomon
Amendment: A War on Campus, ARMY LAW., May 2006, at 12–19.
54
508 U.S. 520 (1993).
55
Id. at 541–42.
56
EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 76.
57
Id. at 74. Justice Breyer has reached a similar conclusion based on the Court’s unanimous cases.
STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 110 (2005); see
also Michael W. McConnell, Active Liberty: A Progressive Alternative to Textualism and Originalism?,
119 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2390 (2006).
58
EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 79–80.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 82.
62
Id. at 96.
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“[o]n occasion, procedural convictions may generate alliances that transcend ideological lines.”63
In Eisgruber’s view, the relationship between political and procedural
values lies at the heart of judicial philosophy. Eisgruber defines a “judicial
philosophy” as “a pattern of selective deference” that “identif[ies] one set of
issues about which judges should defer to other government officials, and
another set about which judges should apply and enforce their own, independent view of what the Constitution means.”64 As an example, Eisgruber
describes Justice Brennan’s judicial philosophy, grounded in footnote 4 of
United States v. Carolene Products Co.,65 as a pattern of selective deference
in which the courts defer to legislators on issues of “economic regulation”
but intervene to guard “participatory rights” in the democratic system and
“protect vulnerable minorities from hostile majorities.”66 If Justices inevitably make political choices, but also inevitably subordinate their political
choices to procedural commitments in some circumstances, a judicial philosophy describes the types of cases in which a Justice is willing to defer—
whether to Congress, to administrative agencies, or to precedent.
Building on this understanding of how Supreme Court Justices make
decisions, Eisgruber argues that we should prefer a particular kind of judicial philosophy, which he describes as “moderate.”67 In Eisgruber’s view,
there are “two features that characterize a moderate judicial philosophy.”68
The first is “an open-mindedness toward novel claims of constitutional justice brought by disadvantaged groups or persons.”69 A moderate Justice, he
explains, sees judicial review as “a way to make the country more inclusive
and more responsive to the claims of disadvantaged groups who have suffered through prejudice, misunderstanding, malice, or neglect.”70 Although
he provides few specifics, Eisgruber notes that this “open-minded, flexible
approach to constitutional problems” has had “evident” application with respect to “such topics as marital privacy, abortion, and gay rights.”71 According to Eisgruber, a moderate Justice must be willing to intervene to
protect the disadvantaged even in the absence of a clear warrant in the constitutional text.72

63

Id.
Id. at 99.
65
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
66
EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 101–02.
67
Id. at 180.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 121. As a descriptive matter, we find this prong of Eisgruber’s definition closer to “liberal”
than “moderate.” See infra notes 97–114 and accompanying text.
71
EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 121.
72
Id. at 122 (“[M]oderation . . . also emphasizes that courts must sometimes be prepared to craft
novel, controversial legal remedies in response to claims of constitutional injustice.”).
64
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The second feature of a moderate judicial philosophy, according to
Eisgruber, is “a lively and thoughtful understanding of the limits of the judicial role.”73 Thus, a moderate Justice “proceed[s] cautiously when enforcing the Constitution” because “the effective pursuit of constitutional goals
. . . requires a kind of active partnership between judges and the elected
branches in which judges will usually play the subsidiary role.”74 In other
words, moderate Justices are more likely than extremists to subordinate
their ideological values to their procedural values.75 Moderates, in Eisgruber’s view, also prefer flexible standards over bright-line rules, to give the
other branches maximum room to maneuver.76
2. Two Partial Objections.—Eisgruber begins on firm ground in
thoroughly dismantling the umpire analogy. Although that account of the
Court’s work is so oversimplified that it would be dismissed as a straw man
in academic circles,77 Eisgruber demonstrates that the umpire analogy has
real currency in the public debate.78 His model of Supreme Court decisionmaking, and in particular his conception of a judicial philosophy as a
relationship between political and procedural values, is thought-provoking
and innovative. Nonetheless, Eisgruber’s account of how Supreme Court
Justices decide politically controversial cases prompts two partial objections.
First, Eisgruber blurs the distinction between political and procedural
values, making it unclear why some values qualify as procedural while others do not. The term “procedural” is a misnomer, as Eisgruber seems to
recognize,79 because many of the values he describes have nothing to do
with rules of procedure, even if in some sense they inform the “process” by
73

Id. at 120.
Id. at 121. Oddly, Eisgruber does not describe these attributes—deliberate caution and a selfconsciously subsidiary role for the Court—as forms of “judicial restraint.” Other scholars have described judicial restraint as encompassing those characteristics, see, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, Constitutional Humility, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 23, 27 (2007); Richard A. Posner, The Meaning of Judicial SelfRestraint, 59 IND. L.J. 1, 10 (1983), so it is curious that Eisgruber dismisses judicial restraint as incoherent, EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 31.
75
EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 180–81.
76
Id. at 121; see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreward: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 100–01 (1992).
77
For more than a century, scholars have roundly criticized similar conceptions of judging as a
purely technical task, such as Thomas Jefferson’s description of judges as “mere machine[s],” see Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Pendleton (Aug. 26, 1776), in 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
505 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950), and Christopher Langdell’s “mechanical jurisprudence,” see Roscoe
Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908).
See also BRIAN BIX,
JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 175–88 (3d ed. 2004) (describing American legal realist critiques of strong formalism in judicial decisionmaking and recounting the “legal-academic cliché” that
“we are all realists now”).
78
EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 6–7.
79
See id. at 80 (alluding to the possibility of other labels and insisting that there is nothing “magic”
about the term “procedural”).
74
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which a Justice thinks about a legal question. Nor does Eisgruber argue
that these values should be called “procedural” because they are neutral and
noncontroversial. To the contrary, he “insists” that these values are politically contested in at least two ways.80 One is that the initial choice of procedural values may be controversial because some procedural values skew
in favor of particular political results. For example, Eisgruber acknowledges that “the proposition that ‘accused terrorists must receive all the
rights afforded to other criminal defendants’ describes a value that is both
procedural and recognizably liberal.”81 Another, as noted above, is that
procedural values are often malleable or conflicting, and they may yield to
political values in particular cases. The Court in FAIR, Eisgruber explains,
could have curtailed its deference to Congress in military matters “when
important values such as academic freedom or the rights of minorities are at
stake.”82
Eisgruber’s swift rejection of originalism illustrates the blurred line
that he draws between political and procedural values. Given Eisgruber’s
acknowledgements about the politically contestable and abstract nature of
procedural values, he readily could have endorsed originalism as a “procedural” principle, valuable in moderating Justices’ political principles and illustrative of how adjudication differs from lawmaking. Even if he is right
that originalism often leads to conservative results in practice, it is no more
malleable than many of his other procedural values. More importantly,
originalism has led scholars and judges to results that conflict with their
ideological commitments or political values. Originalist arguments have
persuaded liberal scholars like Laurence Tribe and Akhil Amar to conclude
that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms that is
not dependent on service in a militia.83 Originalism also has led conservative scholars to conclude that some laws they support are unconstitutional
and some policies they oppose are constitutionally permitted.84 On the Su-

80

Id. at 95.
Id. at 9; see also id. at 94–95 (characterizing John Hart Ely’s “representation-reinforcing” theory
of judicial review as a procedural value, but also the product of “interpretive choices that were politically and philosophically controversial”).
82
Id. at 96.
83
See Laurence H. Tribe, Sanity and the Second Amendment, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 2008, at A16
(“[S]ome liberal scholars like me, having studied the text and history closely, have concluded, against
our political instincts, that the Second Amendment protects more than a collective right to own and use
guns in the service of state militias and national guard units.”); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL
OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 216–23 (1998); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 47–70 (1999).
84
See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure
Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 769, 859–63 (2006) (proposing to abolish life tenure for Supreme Court Justices but concluding that a statute to accomplish that goal would be unconstitutional);
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Someone Should Have Told Spiro Agnew, in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES,
CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 75, 75–76 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998) (not81
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preme Court, it has prompted some Justices to cast ideologically unexpected votes, such as when Justices Scalia and Thomas have sided with
criminal defendants in Confrontation Clause85 and sentencing cases86 and
against businesses in punitive damages cases.87 Because the hallmark of a
procedural value is that “[o]n occasion” it “may generate alliances that transcend ideological lines,”88 originalism would appear to qualify.
Surprisingly, however, Eisgruber criticizes originalism for its “ideological slant.”89 He not only notes that most originalists are conservatives,
but he also suggests that many conservatives subscribe to originalism precisely because they find the socially conservative views of earlier generations appealing.90 In addition, Eisgruber argues that disagreements among
originalists about the proper inferences from historical sources serve as evidence that originalism is a malleable approach that can be bent to serve
ideological purposes. Noting the debate between Justice Scalia and Judge
Michael McConnell about the original meaning of the Free Exercise Clause,
for example, Eisgruber finds it “difficult to take originalist analysis seriously.”91 “It would be one thing if there were a school of originalist judges
whose historical research regularly led them to reach constitutional interpretations at odds with their own political convictions,” he writes, but in reality
most originalists reach results driven by political preferences.92 These are
the same defects, however, that Eisgruber readily forgives—indeed, “insists” upon—in his procedural values.93
Eisgruber’s central argument about originalism is that it cannot spare
Justices from the necessity of making politically controversial judgments.94
That is a sound objection. Many originalists concede that the original
meaning of the constitutional text does not supply a clear answer to every
ing that under Article I, Section 3, the Vice President has a sound argument for presiding at his own impeachment trial and noting the resulting potential for abuse by an “evil, diabolical” Vice President).
85
See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
86
See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
87
See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 598 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Eisgruber
acknowledges that Justice Scalia’s adherence to textualism and originalism drove his vote in the punitive
damages cases, and even concedes that “Scalia’s methodological commitments do matter at the margins.” EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 115. Yet he does not classify textualism or originalism as “procedural” values and specifically concludes that originalism is “incoherent.” Id. at 31–39.
88
EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 96.
89
Id. at 39–40.
90
See id. at 40–41.
91
Id. at 40. Compare Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (Scalia, J.), and City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 537 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in part), with Michael W. McConnell,
The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409
(1990), and Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1109 (1990).
92
EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 40.
93
Id. at 95.
94
Id. at 35.
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interpretive question, leaving some core of hard cases involving abstract or
vague constitutional provisions that require construction using other methods.95 But for some Justices and scholars, originalism serves to narrow the
range of permissible choices in the interpretation of constitutional text, and
at least in some cases originalists have reached results that run contrary to
their political preferences.96 Eisgruber’s rejection of originalism as incoherent—even as he praises other contestable values that in his view skew in favor of particular ideological results—creates confusion about what values
qualify as “procedural” and why.
Second, Eisgruber’s definition of a moderate is supposed to appeal to
the political center, but its first prong is noticeably left-leaning. Special solicitude for the claims of the disadvantaged may be an admirable quality in
a Justice, but surely Eisgruber knows that it is a liberal quality. Indeed, that
requirement could have been lifted straight from the judicial philosophy of
Justice Brennan, whom Eisgruber describes as one of the Court’s “most famous and effective liberals.”97 As “the quintessential Carolene Products
justice,” Justice Brennan surely showed the requisite open-mindedness to
the claims of the disadvantaged through his “functional consideration[] [of]
the judiciary’s role as a defender of vulnerable minorities and individuals.”98 As a matter of partisan politics, moreover, the Democratic Party for
years has advertised itself as the party of the disadvantaged—the poor, the
elderly, consumers, organized labor, women, and racial minorities.99 One
95

See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 1–19 (1999); Barnett, supra note 44, at 645–46 (“Due to either ambiguity
or generality, the original meaning of the text may not always determine a unique rule of law to be applied to a particular case or controversy. . . . When this happens, interpretation must be supplemented
by constitutional construction—within the bounds established by original meaning.”); Michael Stokes
Paulsen, How to Interpret the Constitution (and How Not To), 115 YALE L.J. 2037, 2057 (2006);
Lawrence B. Solum & Robert W. Bennett, A Dialogue on Originalism Occasioned by
Bennett’s Electoral College Reform Ain’t Easy, 101 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 31, 38 (2006),
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2006/4/.
96
See supra notes 83–87 and accompanying text.
97
EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 184.
98
Id. at 103. Eisgruber presumably does not consider Justice Brennan a moderate based on the second prong of his definition, which requires caution and partnership with the legislature. See id. at 183
(describing Justices Brennan and Scalia as “bold justices who author grand jurisprudential gestures and
radical changes in the law”).
99
See 2004 DEMOCRATIC NAT’L CONVENTION COMM., STRONG AT HOME, RESPECTED IN THE
WORLD: THE 2004 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL PLATFORM FOR AMERICA 22, 25, 31, 38 (2004), available
at http://www.democrats.org/pdfs/2004platform.pdf; Mario Cuomo, Keynote Address at the 1984 Democratic National Convention (July 16, 1984), available at http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/
PDFFiles/Mario%20Cuomo%20-%201984%20DNC%20Keynote.pdf (asserting that Democrats seek to
protect “the whole family”); Morris K. Udall, Keynote Address at the 1980 Democratic National Convention (Aug. 11, 1980), available at http://www.library.arizona.edu/exhibits/udall/dnc_80.pdf (“[W]e
have been the party of the disadvantaged in our society. This is the party that cares about the widow in
the nursing home, with the kids grown up and gone away. Sick people, poor people, the small businessman and the young American trying to find a decent job.”).
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would have expected a “moderate” judicial philosophy to feature only demonstrably centrist political values. Instead, Eisgruber’s definition of moderation begins on the left, rather than in the middle.
Consider, for example, that Eisgruber describes exactly five of the
Court’s current members as moderates: Stevens,100 Ginsburg,101 Breyer,102
Souter,103 and Kennedy.104 It is true that on some issues, such as regulatory
policy, the Roberts Court has moved to the right of its predecessors.105 Still,
it is difficult to argue, as Eisgruber does, that there is not a single identifiably liberal Justice on the Court today. To use but a few possible measures,
William Landes and Richard Posner have shown that in cases through the
2006 Term, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg cast liberal votes in approximately two-thirds of cases, placing both of them at the cusp of the most liberal quartile of Justices since 1937.106 Similarly, the measure of judicial
ideology developed in a 2002 article by Andrew Martin and Kevin Quinn
(Martin-Quinn scores), which is used widely by political scientists, ranks
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg at the cusp of the most liberal quartile of Justices since 1953.107 Eisgruber’s assessment is at least out of step with the
100

EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 29 (describing Justice Stevens as neither too liberal nor conservative); id. at 121 (describing Justice Stevens as a “paradigmatic moderate[]”).
101
Id. at 119, 156.
102
Id. at 120–21.
103
Id. at 121.
104
Id.
105
See Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court Inc., N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 16, 2008, at 38 (describing an
“ideological sea change on the Supreme Court” that has left “no economic populists on the court, even
on the liberal wing”); see also Posting of Eric Posner to Convictions: Slate’s Blog on Legal Issues,
http://www.slate.com/blogs/blogs/convictions/archive/2008/03/17/is-the-supreme-court-biased-in-favorof-business.aspx (Mar. 17, 2008, 3:16 p.m.) (“[T]he Supreme Court is not increasingly pro-business, but
maybe it is increasingly pro-market . . . .”).
106
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical Study 47
(Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 404), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1126403. In determining whether votes were liberal or conservative, Landes and Posner used a modified version of the method originally developed by Harold J. Spaeth for his comprehensive database of
Supreme Court decisions beginning with the Warren Court. See HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE ORIGINAL
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL DATABASE: 1953–2006 TERMS: DOCUMENTATION 53–55
(2006), http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/allcourt_codebook.pdf. The Spaeth database generally codes
pro-defendant, pro-civil liberties, anti-business, pro-union, and pro-judicial power votes as liberal, and
votes in the opposite direction as conservative. Id. Landes and Posner modified those classifications for
certain free speech cases (including commercial speech and campaign finance cases), labor cases, and
federal power cases. Landes & Posner, supra, at 42. By Landes and Posner’s measure, Justice Stevens
cast conservative votes in 34.1% of cases and Justice Ginsburg cast conservative votes in 31.2% of
cases, placing them at positions thirty-two and thirty-five, respectively, in an ideological ranking of
forty-three Justices since 1937. Id. at 47. Justices Kennedy and O’Connor, by contrast, cast conservative votes in 64.7% of cases and 68.0% of cases, respectively, placing both in the most conservative
quartile of Justices. Id.
107
Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain
Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134, 145–46 (2002). MartinQuinn scores are a partly dynamic measure of a Justice’s “ideal point” ideologically, based on patterns
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“conventional wisdom,” which “routinely describ[es] some justices as liberal and others as conservative.”108 Even Eisgruber mentions “the Court’s
liberals” when discussing the FAIR case—an odd reference, if the Court in
fact consists entirely of moderates and extreme conservatives.109
In particular, a willingness to vindicate constitutional claims concerning “such topics as marital privacy, abortion, and gay rights,”110 regardless
of their support in the constitutional text, would seem to place a Justice to
the left of the fault line in constitutional adjudication that is Roe v. Wade.111
Eisgruber insists that his definition of a “moderate” Justice does not require
a firm commitment on Roe because it “tells us very little about how he or
she would weigh the state’s interest in protecting fetal life.”112 The implication, however, is that his definition does tell us something about how to
weigh the opposing interests. Although we do not doubt that Eisgruber is
sincere in his attempt to craft a definition that avoids locking a nominee into
a position on abortion, it does not appear that he has succeeded. The roster
of Justices he identifies as moderates under his two-part definition—Breyer,
Ginsburg, Harlan, Kennedy, O’Connor, Powell, Souter, and Stevens113—all
have supported broad privacy rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, and
those that have expressly considered Roe and its successors have held unanimously that the Constitution protects a right to abortion.114
of agreement between Justices, and have been used for assessing ideological “drift” over time. See
Ward Farnsworth, The Use and Limits of Martin-Quinn Scores to Assess Supreme Court Justices, with
Special Attention to the Problem of Ideological Drift, 101 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 143, 144–46
(2007), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/11/. The Martin-Quinn scores for
Justices Stevens (-0.555) and Ginsburg (-0.179) placed them at positions twenty-two and twenty-one,
respectively, among twenty-nine Justices between 1953 and 1999. See Martin & Quinn, supra, at 146.
Justices Kennedy (1.345) and O’Connor (1.325), by contrast, ranked among the Court’s most conservative Justices at positions five and six, respectively. See id.
108
EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 18.
109
Id. at 82.
110
Id. at 121.
111
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
112
EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 190.
113
The Next Justice contains several lists of Justices who qualify as moderates under Eisgruber’s
definition. See id. at 44, 119, 121, 156. Several of those lists are referenced in the index as characterizing these Justices “as moderate.” Id. at 226, 230, 233–34, 237–38.
114
See Roe, 410 U.S. at 113 (opinion of the Court joined by Powell, J.); Planned Parenthood of Se.
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 843–44 (1992) (joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.); id. at
912–14 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 920
(2000) (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, & Ginsburg, JJ.). Justice Harlan left the Court
shortly before Roe was decided, so we cannot be certain how he would have voted in cases like Roe, Casey, and Stenberg. His concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965)
(Harlan, J., concurring), did conclude that a state-law prohibition against contraception “violates basic
values ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’” and therefore violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
In our correspondence with Eisgruber about an earlier draft of this Review Essay, Eisgruber indicated that Justice White might also be classified as a moderate, noting that he refers to Justice White as a
“moderate liberal” at one point in the book. Email from Christopher L. Eisgruber to authors (Mar. 5,
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Eisgruber offers two justifications for his definition of a moderate.
The first is circular. After analyzing the judicial philosophies of Justices
Breyer and O’Connor, whom he considers to be moderates, Eisgruber concludes that both have been especially protective of the disadvantaged.115
The second is unpersuasive. Eisgruber contends that special solicitude for
the disadvantaged is an extension of impartiality. Just as a judge must “ensure that defendants get fair trials,” a judge has “a similar duty to give fair
and impartial hearing to claims of justice that depend upon unclear or unsettled constitutional principles”—particularly, it seems, where the rights of
the disadvantaged are at stake.116 On its face, that inference is dubious, and
Eisgruber scarcely defends it. A hallmark of judicial impartiality, in Eisgruber’s view, is that Justices “ought to be neutral among parties”—for example, by declining to participate in cases where they have a personal
interest.117 Yet Eisgruber’s definition of a moderate appears to be expressly
non-neutral among parties, placing a thumb on the scale in favor of any
party that is disadvantaged.118 There are serious arguments that the Judiciary has a special obligation to protect the disadvantaged, especially with re-

2008, 12:26 CST) (on file with authors) (citing EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 78). That reference to Justice White, however, did not relate to Eisgruber’s definition of a moderate, but rather to the unusual political alignment of the Court in the flag-burning cases. See EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 78. Indeed,
that same sentence classifies Justice Kennedy as one of the Court’s “most conservative” Justices, not as
a moderate, even though Eisgruber later explicitly identifies Kennedy as a moderate under his two-part
definition. See id. at 78, 119, 121. In our view, any credible definition of a moderate must include Justice White, whose Martin-Quinn score places him exactly in the center ideologically among Justices
since 1953. See Martin & Quinn, supra note 107, at 146 (placing Justice White at position fifteen
among twenty-nine Justices with a score of 0.420); see also Landes & Posner, supra note 106, at 46
(calculating that Justice White cast conservative votes in 60.5% of civil liberties cases but liberal votes
in 61.6% of economic, union, and tax cases). If Eisgruber agrees with that assessment, the book would
have benefited from an explicit discussion of how Justice White’s judicial philosophy fits within Eisgruber’s two-part definition of “moderate.”
115
EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 120.
116
Id. at 182.
117
Id. at 63.
118
Eisgruber also defends his definition of a moderate on the ground that he “suspect[s] that many
Americans will be attracted to the idea that courts should . . . [be] receptive to new claims of injustice
from powerless or neglected persons or groups.” Id. at 183. He offers no support for this “suspect[ed]”
democratic mandate, however, and we suspect that liberals, not moderates, would be the group of
Americans most likely to find that value attractive. Indeed, during the 2008 presidential campaign, Democrat Barack Obama has embraced criteria for selecting Supreme Court Justices that are strikingly
similar to Eisgruber’s. Obama intends to nominate judges “who [are] sympathetic enough to those who
are on the outside, those who are vulnerable, those who are powerless, those who can't have access to
political power and as a consequence can’t protect themselves . . . from being dealt with sometimes unfairly.” CNN Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer: Interview with Barack Obama (CNN television broadcast
May 11, 2008), available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0805/11/le.01.html. Contrary to
Eisgruber’s prediction, these attributes have not drawn bipartisan praise as a moderate approach broadly
acceptable to most Americans. Instead, conservatives have criticized the approach outlined by Obama,
while liberals have praised it. See David G. Savage, Two Visions of the Supreme Court, L.A. TIMES,
May 19, 2008, at A8.

1885

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

spect to rights of democratic participation. John Hart Ely,119 Cass Sunstein,120 Robert Cover,121 and many others have articulated principles
broadly similar to Eisgruber’s. Yet Eisgruber draws on none of this literature, instead relying on a questionable inference from impartiality.
By placing a preference for “moderate” Justices at the core of his recommendations for the Supreme Court appointments process, Eisgruber has
assigned himself the challenge of defining a moderate judicial philosophy
with widespread appeal. Despite his best efforts, the definition articulated
in The Next Justice will strike most observers as conspicuously left-leaning.
That is an important shortcoming of the book, because without agreement
on what it means to be a moderate, Eisgruber will have difficulty convincing the public, and senators in particular, to demand the appointment of
moderates to the Court.
Notwithstanding these objections, Eisgruber has developed an insightful and thought-provoking account of how Supreme Court Justices make
decisions. His model of a judicial philosophy as a relationship between political and procedural values is particularly innovative. His arguments lose
steam, however, in the book’s closing chapters, which discuss how to reform the Supreme Court appointments process.
B. Repairing the Supreme Court Appointments Process
Despite the subtitle Repairing the Supreme Court Appointments Process, Eisgruber’s The Next Justice allocates relatively little attention to how
the appointments process became broken or how to fix it. Eisgruber’s
model of Supreme Court decisionmaking is intriguing, but it dominates the
book, leaving the policy reform discussion underdeveloped. We now turn
to the book’s assessment of the problem and its program for reform.
1. An Incomplete Diagnosis.—In a terse chapter offering a diagnosis
of the ills of the judicial appointments process, Eisgruber points to Presidents who have “raised the stakes” by nominating extremists rather than
moderates.122 As examples, he points to President Nixon’s nominations of
Warren Burger, Clement Haynsworth, and Harold Carswell, and President
Reagan’s nominations of Antonin Scalia and Robert Bork.123 It used to be
different, Eisgruber says. President Eisenhower made nominations to the
Supreme Court with almost no consideration of judicial philosophy: he
tapped Earl Warren as Chief Justice as payback for delivering California in
119

See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 73–179 (1980).
See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 187, 192–93 (1990) (proposing a substantive canon of interpretation requiring broad interpretation of statutes protecting disadvantaged
groups).
121
See Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE
L.J. 1287 (1982).
122
EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 124–43.
123
Id. at 125–29.
120
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the presidential election, and he named William Brennan because he wanted
to appoint a Catholic Democrat.124 For Eisgruber, the ideal state of affairs
would be “a revival of the Eisenhower Administration’s moderate approach
to judicial appointments.”125
But Eisgruber has no illusions of a return to a halcyon nonpolitical age.
“Ironically enough,” he explains, it was Eisenhower’s appointments to the
Warren Court, which rendered controversial decisions on hot-button issues
like race and abortion, “that [have] precluded subsequent presidents from
following Eisenhower’s examples.”126 Today it is “unimaginable” that a
President would pay so little attention to a nominee’s political ideology.127
Expecting Presidents voluntarily to depoliticize the appointments process is
unrealistic, he acknowledges, because “[t]he Supreme Court’s political
prominence on any number of issues gives liberal and conservative presidents alike the incentive to look for ideologically pure nominees.”128
Rather than focus directly on the Presidency,129 Eisgruber indirectly
addresses the problem of ideological selection by suggesting two reform
measures for the Senate. First, at the confirmation hearings, “the Senate’s
aim, and the public’s, should be to understand what a nominee thinks judicial review is good for, and to evaluate whether that judicial philosophy is
an acceptable one.”130 Consonant with his preference for judicial moderates, Eisgruber recommends questions aimed at uncovering extremism.131
Second, the Senate must “vigorously” exercise its “constitutional prerogative to insist on the appointment of judicial moderates.”132 The Senate
“ought not to regard the confirmation hearings either as the principal means
for exploring a nominee’s judicial philosophy or as a test that, if passed, entitles the nominee to confirmation.”133 Instead, senators should consult pub124

Id. at 128–29. Similarly, Warren Harding appointed Pierce Butler to the Supreme Court because
he was looking for a Catholic Democrat to replace the retiring Joseph Day. See David R. Stras, Pierce
Butler: A Supreme Technician, 62 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009).
125
EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 142. This abbreviated timeline is a bit misleading, as it leaves out
the highly political appointments to the Court by President Franklin Roosevelt during the New Deal. If
any President “raised the stakes” by selecting Justices with an eye toward specific results, it was Roosevelt, whose self-conscious effort to “wrest control of the judiciary from the conservative forces of his
day” included an infamous court-packing plan. WITTES, supra note 13, at 33.
126
EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 142.
127
Id.
128
Id. at 187.
129
To be fair, Eisgruber laments that many scholars have unsuccessfully proposed reforms to the
judicial appointments process because such reforms have failed to take into account the strength of the
Presidency. See id. at 124–25. Eisgruber’s proposed reforms, however, focus almost exclusively on the
Senate. Indeed, he concedes the President’s incentives to make ideologically driven appointments, instead looking to the Senate to prevent the President from placing extremists on the Court. Id. at 186–91.
130
Id. at 187.
131
Id. at 169–77.
132
Id. at 183.
133
Id. at 187.
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licly available materials about a nominee and, “[i]f the nominee’s record
suggests to senators that his or her views about the purpose of judicial review are rigid or extreme rather than moderate,” they should reject the
nomination.134
To simplify, Eisgruber wants the Senate to “get smart” and to “get
tough.” Senators must ask smarter questions that are designed to assess
whether a nominee is a moderate. Senators must also stand tough against a
President who nominates an extremist, even if they find the nominee’s political views attractive. Before delving into the specifics of Eisgruber’s reforms, there are two notable flaws in Eisgruber’s assessment of how the
appointments process became broken.
One is that Eisgruber’s proposed reforms for the Senate are not tailored
to the problems that he identifies in the appointments process. He is correct
that Presidents have chosen more ideological nominees in response to the
Supreme Court’s increasingly prominent role in deciding hot-button political, social, and cultural issues.135 That account, however, suggests that the
Judiciary has raised the stakes by issuing politically controversial opinions,
and Presidents have acted largely in response to the expansion of judicial
power. For that reason, Eisgruber’s solution—a smarter, tougher Senate as
a check on an out-of-control President—does not match his account of the
source of the problem, which is rooted in political pressures generated by
the Court. Senators face similar pressure, and Eisgruber offers no reason to
believe that they can “get smart” and “get tough” where Presidents have
fallen short.
Another flaw is that, like many other commentators, Eisgruber makes
little attempt to identify the full range of factors that have contributed to the
politicization of the appointments process.136 He zeroes in on one: the
choices of Presidents in response to the controversial role of the Supreme
Court. That account, however, is incomplete.
As one of us has argued elsewhere, structural and external factors, in
addition to judicial factors, have driven a fundamental transformation of the
judicial appointments process over the last eighty years.137 Structurally, the
Seventeenth Amendment and the advent of roll-call votes and public hearings on judicial nominations have made senators directly accountable to
their constituents for every vote on Supreme Court nominees.138 In addi134

Id.
Id. at 142 (conceding that ideological appointments to the Court began in response to the controversial decisions of the Warren Court); see also Stras, supra note 11, at 1068–69 (noting that the Judiciary has contributed to the high stakes and politicization of the confirmation process “as the federal
courts are increasingly injected into matters of social, religious, and political importance”).
136
Stras, supra note 11, at 1056–57 (discussing previous literature that has offered a partial, but not
comprehensive, explanation for changes in the Supreme Court appointments process).
137
Id. at 1057.
138
Id. at 1057–62 (describing the unanticipated effects of the Seventeenth Amendment on the Supreme Court appointments process); see also JOHN ANTHONY MALTESE, THE SELLING OF SUPREME
135
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tion, external pressure from interest groups and the media has increased the
visibility and the political consequences of those votes.139 Senators are under considerable pressure to cast a vote consistent with their own “policy
brand” because interest groups and constituents pay close attention to votes
on judicial nominations.140 The combined effect of these changes has been
intense political pressure on senators to deliver, or to block, Justices with
particular ideological views. Moreover, these structural and external factors
operate directly on the Senate, undermining Eisgruber’s assumption that
senators will be able to withstand the same political pressures that have
prompted Presidents to raise the stakes. As we explain below, by beginning
from an incomplete diagnosis, Eisgruber has arrived at an ineffective prescription.
2. Get Smart.—The first plank of Eisgruber’s proposal focuses on the
Senate confirmation hearings. His complaint is that nominees to the Court
“[i]n the post-Bork era” have “played it safe, refusing to say anything
meaningful about their view of the Constitution and the Court’s role.”141 To
overcome nominees’ evasiveness, Eisgruber proposes that senators should
try “to understand what a nominee thinks judicial review is good for” by
asking questions about procedural values and the circumstances in which
the nominee believes judicial review is appropriate.142 He also suggests
some specific questions, like, “Could you tell us something about the values
and purposes that will guide you when you interpret provisions like the
equal protection clause?” and “[W]hen and why is it a good thing to have
judges intervening in the political process of a democratic country?”143
Answers to these questions would indeed be illuminating. In fact, a
host of other scholars have preceded Eisgruber in proposing equally penetrating questions for Supreme Court nominees.144 For three reasons, howCOURT NOMINEES 52–53 (1995) (describing the adoption of a requirement for a roll-call vote on judicial
nominations); Michael J. Gerhardt, Toward a Comprehensive Understanding of the Federal Appointments Process, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 467, 490–92 (1998) (discussing the effects of public hearings on nominees).
139
Stras, supra note 11, at 1062–68.
140
On politicians’ conscious efforts to shape their “policy brand,” see Helmut Schneider, Branding
in Politics—Manifestations, Relevance and Identity-Oriented Management, 3 J. POL. MARKETING 41,
49–50 (2004).
141
EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 4.
142
Id. at 187.
143
Id. at 169–70, 173.
144
See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 8, at 151 (arguing that the Senate should eschew ideological questioning in favor of evaluating the moral character of nominees); DAVIS, supra note 14, at 161–63 (criticizing senators’ “softball” questions and their requests for commitments from nominees, and urging the
Senate Judiciary Committee to “restore their legitimate role and be willing to hold interest groups at
bay”); TRIBE, supra note 9, at 94 (proposing that senators’ questions be directed at whether nominees
adhere to “constitutional landmarks [that] are . . . crucial to our sense of what America is all about”);
Lininger, supra note 17, at 1328–29 (proposing revisions to the ABA’s code of judicial ethics that would
allow nominees to answer more questions about particular cases); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Straighten-
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ever, it is difficult to imagine Eisgruber’s change in emphasis at the confirmation hearings succeeding.
First, senators have been unwilling or unable to ask comparable questions in the past. Senate confirmation hearings today are designed principally to satisfy the demands of external players, especially the media and
interest groups.145 Many senators therefore use the hearings to make political statements, not to ask questions.146 Eisgruber encourages senators to use
the national spotlight to ask subtle and sophisticated questions in service of
the “bland virtue” of moderation,147 even though his proposal would not
please interest groups that care “above all else” about results on particular
political issues, especially abortion.148 That expectation is unrealistic because interest groups now play a central role in the Senate hearings149 and
they care almost entirely about results, not philosophy.150 As one senator
put it, “If an interest group says ‘this is a key vote, we’re watching this
vote,’ then the easy thing to do is to vote the way the group wants.”151
Senators therefore have strong political incentives to use the hearings to

ing Out The Confirmation Mess, 105 YALE L.J. 549, 562–70 (1995) (book review) (supporting a robustly ideological confirmation process, including “litmus test” questions); Robert Post & Reva Siegel,
Questioning Justice: Law and Politics in Judicial Confirmations, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 38, 38
(2006), http://www.thepocketpart.org/2006/01/post_and_siegel.html (proposing that senators “ask Supreme Court nominees about how they would have voted in cases that the Supreme Court has already
decided”).
145
Stras, supra note 11, at 1066.
146
DAVIS, supra note 14, at 160–61 (“[Many senators] use their time as a pulpit preacher rather
than as a questioner.”); see also Gerhardt, supra note 138, at 531 (noting that Senate confirmation hearings emerged because the practice “provided senators with the opportunity, especially in high-profile
cases, to get free publicity for their activities”).
147
EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 183.
148
Id. at 190.
149
WITTES, supra note 13, at 32 (noting that interest groups “to a great extent, now drive the process”); Stras, supra note 11, at 1062 (“[T]he number and influence of organized interest groups participating in judicial nominations has skyrocketed over the past sixty years.”); see MALTESE, supra note
138, at 91; Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Lobbying for Justice: Organized Interests, Supreme
Court Nominations, and the United States Senate, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 499, 519 (1998); Arthur D. Hellman, Reining in the Supreme Court: Are Term Limits the Answer?, in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM
LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 291, 302 (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006)
(“[T]he ‘judicial confirmation wars,’ with their extreme rhetoric and unwillingness to compromise, are
driven in very large part by the agendas of advocacy groups for whom the nominees are trophies—
trophies of power and influence.”).
150
We know of no interest group, for example, that pressures both parties to appoint moderates to
the Supreme Court. Certainly such pressure has not come from the groups most explicitly interested in
judicial philosophy: the Federalist Society and the American Constitution Society.
151
Lauren C. Bell, Senate Confirmations in an Interest Group Age, EXTENSIONS, Spring 2004,
available at http://www.ou.edu/special/albertctr/extensions/spring2004/Bell.html (quoting an anonymous senator).
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score points with interest groups, to bolster their liberal or conservative
bona fides, and to draw attention to their pet issues.152
Second, nominees have proven adept at avoiding questions. Eisgruber
deplores the fact that nominees since Robert Bork have answered questions
with platitudes and evasion,153 but he recognizes that no questions posed by
senators can operate as “magic bullets” to “pierce the defensive armor of
nominees.”154 Indeed, it is likely that his proposed questions will be easy to
dodge. Most “procedural” values, like deference to other decisionmakers,
sound neutral and noncontroversial, giving a nominee an easy way out: endorsing the principle in the abstract but declining to speculate about how it
might apply in particular cases. Both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito used this strategy in responding to questions about stare decisis at
their confirmation hearings.155 It would require heroic persistence by a
senator to extract answers from a recalcitrant nominee that would yield
enough information to uncover a complete, moderate judicial philosophy
conforming to Eisgruber’s model.156
Instead, Eisgruber’s goal is to craft questions that “permit a cooperative nominee to share his or her judicial philosophy without taking specific
positions on hot-button cases.”157 The real challenge, then, is to convince
nominees to “cooperate,” and as Eisgruber concedes, they have done precisely the opposite since the Senate’s rejection of Robert Bork. Eisgruber’s
proposal for senators to “get smart” therefore depends on the success of his
plan for them to “get tough.” Only by shifting the burden to a nominee to
“prov[e] that he or she is [a moderate]” and backing up that shift with a
threat to reject nominees who do not cooperate at the hearings can the Senate expect Eisgruber’s line of questioning to be effective.158

152

See DAVIS, supra note 14, at 161–62; Stras, supra note 11, at 1066 (“[I]t is not unfair to characterize the seemingly futile questioning of a nominee by senators as a stage on which they can posture to
and please constituents and interest groups.”). In some cases, senators have literally read questions from
a script provided by an interest group. DAVIS, supra note 14, at 163. Although interest groups are not
“all-powerful,” they present a serious obstacle to proposals for reform because they wield enormous influence and their “truces are likely to be temporary.” Hellman, supra note 149, at 302.
153
EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 4 (agreeing with Senator Arlen Specter’s characterization of modern confirmation hearings as “a subtle minuet” between senators and nominees).
154
Id. at 169.
155
See Robin Toner, In Complex Dance, Roberts Pays Tribute to Years of Precedent Behind Roe v.
Wade, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2005, at A24 (noting Roberts’s comment that Roe is “entitled to respect
under principles of stare decisis”); Amy Goldstein & Charles Babington, Alito Leaves Door Open to Reversing ‘Roe’, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2006, at A1 (noting Alito’s comment that Roe is “a precedent that
is protected, entitled to respect under the doctrine of stare decisis”).
156
Eisgruber acknowledges this problem but maintains that the Senate can force recalcitrant nominees to answer by “getting tough” and threatening to reject nominees who are not more forthcoming.
See infra Part I.B.3.
157
EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 173 (emphasis added).
158
Id. at 177.
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Third, even if senators were to ask and nominees were to fully answer
Eisgruber’s questions, there is reason to doubt that the answers would be
meaningful. A recent study of the Rehnquist Court by Jason Czarnezki,
William Ford, and Lori Ringhand compared the statements of Justices at
confirmation hearings with their pattern of voting on the Court on four subjects: stare decisis, originalism, the rights of criminal defendants, and the
use of legislative history.159 They concluded that “the confirmation hearings
are providing very little substantive information as to future judicial behavior,”160 finding a particularly weak correlation between Justices’ statements
about stare decisis and the frequency with which they voted to overturn
precedent.161 That conclusion is particularly discouraging for Eisgruber’s
reforms because the study involved answers about some of his “procedural
values.” Yet the study’s conclusion should come as no surprise. Nominees
have every incentive to disclose selectively or obscure aspects of their judicial philosophy to make themselves as appealing as possible to the Senate.
If senators adopted Eisgruber’s “solicitude for the disadvantaged” as a litmus test, for example, even the most conservative nominees would have a
strong incentive to characterize their judicial philosophy as consistent with
that principle, rendering their answers at the confirmation hearings unhelpful.
Ultimately, Eisgruber’s proposal for the Senate to “get smart” is not a
“repair” so much as a change in mindset. What we need, he says, is “a better way to talk about Supreme Court appointments,”162 and the thrust of his
plan is to improve “public understanding[]” of how Supreme Court Justices
decide cases.163 Eisgruber is plainly echoing Stephen Carter, who likewise
has argued that we can clean up the confirmation mess only by changing
“our attitudes toward the Court as an institution” and our understanding of
“the judicial role.”164 As a charter for reform, however, Eisgruber’s plan is
unrealistic. Senators are under tremendous pressure to deliver ideological
results and will not lightly surrender their political goals for the sake of abstractions. Much as we would like to believe in the transformative power of
“attitudes” and “understandings” prescribed by law professors, Eisgruber’s
suggestions are not viable in light of the political realities of the confirmation process.165

159

Jason J. Czarnezki et al., An Empirical Analysis of the Confirmation Hearings of the Justices of
the Rehnquist Natural Court, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 127, 136–37, 150 (2007).
160
Id. at 158.
161
Id. at 140–41.
162
EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 4.
163
Id. at 16.
164
CARTER, supra note 8, at 188–89.
165
See WITTES, supra note 13, at 35 (commenting, on Carter’s proposals, that “the forces that drive
political polarization and partisanship—whatever one believes them to be—[are not] likely to yield before plaintive pleading from one law professor”).
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3. Get Tough.—The second plank of Eisgruber’s plan calls for the
Senate to “get tough.” If a nominee appears to be too extreme or is too recalcitrant in answering questions, the Senate can and should reject the
nomination.166 Eisgruber does not mean merely that senators should insist
upon moderate nominees for tactical reasons, hoping to minimize the damage when the White House is controlled by the opposing party.167 Instead,
because he believes there are “[g]enuine reasons for preferring moderate
Justices,” he expects senators to demand moderation even when they believe an ideologically like-minded extremist could be nominated and confirmed.168
At first glance, this aspect of Eisgruber’s proposal seems more promising. Scholars like Michael Gerhardt and Cass Sunstein have been advancing similar “get tough” recommendations since the early 1990s, urging the
Senate to stop giving nominees the “benefit of the doubt,”169 to develop
“some consensus on the credentials it would like for judicial nominees to
possess . . . [and] adhere to that consensus in spite of presidential opposition,”170 and to assert its “independent role.”171 In fact, the Senate has grown
tougher with respect to nominations to the federal circuit courts. The confirmation rate for those nominees has fallen significantly in the last thirty
years, from 92% under President Carter to 71% under President Clinton and
74.6% under President George W. Bush.172
The increasingly acrimonious battles over nominations to the federal
courts of appeals, however, do not offer an encouraging model for the potential impact of a “get tough” plan in the Senate for Supreme Court nominees. As the Senate has confirmed circuit court nominees at a lower rate,
the pace of the process has also slowed considerably. Between 1945 and
1986, new court of appeals judges were confirmed in an average of one to
two months; between 2000 and 2006, the average time until confirmation
stretched to more than a year.173 Among Article III judgeships, 49 of 871
authorized positions on the federal courts are currently vacant, including
sixteen vacancies on circuit courts.174 The result is a process as “ugly and
divisive” as it has ever been, with many highly qualified candidates unwilling to endure the long struggle to confirmation.175 Surprisingly, Eisgruber
166

EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 142–43.
Id. at 179 (“[I]t is easy to explain these practices on strategic grounds.”).
168
Id.
169
Simson, supra note 16, at 653.
170
See Gerhardt, supra note 15, at 992 (1992).
171
Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 15, at 1512.
172
WITTES, supra note 13, at 39–41; Stras, supra note 11, at 1073. For the Bush Administration,
the rate of confirmation is current through October 2007. Id.
173
WITTES, supra note 13, at 38–39; Stras, supra note 11, at 1073.
174
OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/judicialnominations.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2007).
175
See Stras, supra note 11, at 1074.
167
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almost entirely ignores the transformation of the appellate court appointments process, and thus he overlooks the potentially serious costs—
including indefinite vacancies and a serious drain on the pool of willing
candidates—of encouraging the Senate and President to wage an escalating
war over Supreme Court nominations.
More fundamentally, there are good reasons why a “get tough” strategy
has become difficult for the Senate to execute when evaluating Supreme
Court nominees. As we explain in brief here, and develop more fully in
Part II, proposals for greater resilience on the part of the Senate fail to appreciate the institutional strength and tactical options of the President. A
“get tough” plan underestimates the President in several ways.
First, a “get tough” plan ignores the political realities facing the Senate.
Even in cases of divided government, senators face enormous political pressures. As we explain in Part II, the strategic selection of nominees by a
President can make it politically difficult for senators of either party to
block a nomination. One component of this strategy, as Eisgruber recognizes, is the selection of ideologically moderate nominees.176 A rich empirical literature also demonstrates, however, that choosing nominees
strategically based on other characteristics, especially qualifications, increases the odds of confirmation.177 Selecting a highly qualified individual
helps to weaken Senate resistance, even if the nominee is ideologically distant from most senators.
The challenges of a “get tough” plan are particularly clear in proposals
like Eisgruber’s, which direct senators to repudiate nominations made by
same-party Presidents for being too extreme or for a nominee’s recalcitrance in answering questions. It is simply unrealistic to expect that senators will unilaterally disarm in such a politicized process, rejecting an
ideologically attractive nominee and insisting on a moderate even in the absence of a tactical need and with no assurance that the other party will return the favor when the circumstances are reversed.178 The failed
nomination of Harriet Miers by President George W. Bush dramatically illustrates the point. The Miers nomination was undermined to some degree
by fellow Republicans who controlled the Senate and wanted Bush to
nominate someone more conservative—or at least a more prominent and reliable conservative.179 It is difficult to imagine those senators, under similar
176

See infra Part II.A.
See infra notes 198–202 and accompanying text.
178
CARTER, supra note 8, at 189 (noting that “the nature of modern partisan politics” makes such a
move unlikely because “members of the President’s party will not want to oppose him without very
strong reasons”).
179
JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT 272–73, 276 (2007). Although concerns
about Miers’s qualifications and charges of cronyism also played a role in the unraveling of the nomination, it was clear that many Republican senators would not settle for a moderate—or a “stealth” candidate with the potential to be moderate—and were willing to break ranks with a President of their own
party to avoid ending up with one. Id. at 278–83.
177
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circumstances, accepting Eisgruber’s advice to insist upon someone less
conservative.
Second, and more importantly, plans for the Senate to “get tough” fail
to appreciate the reality that Presidents, too, can “get tough.” When Presidents decide to fight for an imperiled nominee, they have a number of potent weapons at their disposal. We discuss three of the President’s options
in Part II: the use of the bully pulpit, the power to make recess appointments to the Supreme Court, and the strategic use of logrolling techniques
and threats to veto legislation.180 Empirical research by political scientists
suggests that some of these tools have been particularly effective for Supreme Court nominations, even when they have been less effective for circuit court nominations. Although some of these tactics are controversial
and have been used sparingly in the past, they demonstrate how a plan for
the Senate to toughen up might provoke a strong response from the President and only escalate the conflict over judicial appointments. These options help to explain why, to date, the Senate has disappointed Eisgruber
and others who have called for greater resolve in challenging the President’s nominations to the Supreme Court.
II. NAVIGATING THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS
When commentators recommend that the Senate assert itself more vigorously at the confirmation stage to block unacceptable nominees, they often view the process only from the perspective of senators. They fail to
take into account the institutional strength of the Presidency or the myriad
tools at a President’s disposal in navigating the judicial appointments process. The Senate’s assertion of its will in rejecting qualified nominees is
likely only to raise the stakes in future nominations and force Presidents to
get tough in response.
In this Part, drawing on empirical findings by political scientists, we
demonstrate that the conflict over Supreme Court nominations is multifaceted and dynamic. Presidents have powerful tools at their disposal to counteract resistance by the Senate, including increasing the pressure on senators
both by exercising the power of the Presidency and by marshalling external
groups to assist an imperiled nominee. The most commonly deployed and
historically successful tactic is the strategic selection of nominees. Other
tools include: (1) the use of the bully pulpit by the President, (2) the employment or threat of recess appointments to the federal courts, and (3) logrolling techniques or credible threats to veto legislation. We demonstrate
that a President can use these tools to fight back against a “get tough” strategy in the Senate and secure confirmation for many Supreme Court nomi-

180

See infra Parts II.B–D.
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nees, even those that are ideologically divergent from the pivot point of the
Senate.181
A. Strategic Selection
The most basic and powerful tool a President can use to improve confirmation odds is the strategic selection of Supreme Court nominees. Selecting a nominee is a delicate process, and a President’s margin for error
depends on a host of tactical considerations. Nonetheless, the available research suggests some guidelines for Presidents determined to make it difficult for the Senate to reject Supreme Court nominees.
1. Constraints on Strategic Selection.—Most academic research focuses on the confirmation stage of the judicial appointments process—the
factors that influence the Senate’s consideration of judicial nominees.182
The dearth of research on the selection side is due in no small part to the
tiny group of close advisors that are privy to the selection methodologies
employed by Presidents. The institutionalization of the Presidency and the
expansion of the staff of the White House, particularly the Counsel’s office,
have centralized much of the decisionmaking about judicial nominations in
the White House.183 In contrast, the Senate provides a comparatively easy
object of study as the deliberations over judicial nominees are open, heavily
covered by the media, and the fodder of interest group activity.
The available research identifies several constraints on a President’s
selection of a Supreme Court nominee. According to Christine Nemacheck,
who has engaged in the most probing study of presidential selection to date,
perhaps the most important external factor is whether the President faces a
Senate controlled by the opposite party.184 A number of scholars have
found that divided government reduces the likelihood that the Senate will
confirm a judicial nominee and, in recent years, that it also increases the
amount of time required for confirmation.185 Indeed, Sarah Binder and For181

For the confirmation of a Supreme Court nominee, the pivotal senator is likely to be, but is not
always, the fifty-first senator that is willing to vote in favor of confirmation because filibusters of Supreme Court nominees are rare. See CHRISTINE L. NEMACHECK, STRATEGIC SELECTION 28–29 (2007);
Byron J. Moraski & Charles R. Shipan, The Politics of Supreme Court Nominations: A Theory of Institutional Constraints and Choices, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1069, 1093 (1999).
182
See NEMACHECK, supra note 181, at 15; Moraski & Shipan, supra note 181, at 1070.
183
See NEMACHECK, supra note 181, at 85–86, 93, 106.
184
See id. at 66; see also LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS
OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 107 (2005).
185
See NEMACHECK, supra note 181, at 66 (citing multiple studies on both phenomena); Sarah A.
Binder & Forrest Maltzman, Senatorial Delay in Confirming Federal Judges, 1947–1998, 46 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 190, 195 (2002); Nolan McCarty & Rose Razaghian, Advice and Consent: Senate Responses
to Executive Branch Nominations 1885–1996, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1122, 1136–38 (1999). But see Glen
S. Krutz et al., From Abe Fortas to Zoe Baird: Why Some Presidential Nominations Fail in the Senate,
92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 871, 878 (1998) (finding that divided government does not make it more likely
that Supreme Court nominations will fail).
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rest Maltzman found that the hazard rate (or likelihood) of a decision by the
Senate on a judicial nominee “decreases during divided government by
nearly fifty percent compared to periods of unified control.”186 In other
words, a “president would like to appoint his preferred nominee without regard to his opposition’s preferences, but he recognizes that he is constrained
by the Senate, especially when it is controlled by the opposition party.”187
In recent years, the ability of the opposition party to mount a filibuster, especially against lower court nominees, also has influenced presidential selection of judicial nominees.188
In addition, decreased political capital, either because of low approval
ratings or the approach of the end of a term in office, constrains the selection decisions of Presidents.189 As in the case of ordinary legislative initiatives, scholars have found that it becomes more difficult for Presidents to
gain confirmation for a judicial nominee as their remaining time in office
decreases because “the incentive for members of Congress to bargain with
the president declines,” especially if the President is viewed as a “lame
duck.”190 Political scientists have also found that a President’s approval ratings affect nominee selection. Although the impact of approval ratings is
not clear as an empirical matter, some studies have found that high approval
ratings give Presidents greater freedom to nominate a candidate who is
closer to the President’s own ideology.191
The criticality of the particular nomination at issue also constrains the
President’s choice of nominee. “Critical” nominations, those that will influence the ideological balance of a court, receive greater scrutiny than
nominations that replace an outgoing judge with a like-minded successor.192
186

See Binder & Maltzman, supra note 185, at 196.
NEMACHECK, supra note 181, at 66.
188
See id. at 67.
189
See Binder & Maltzman, supra note 185, at 197 (focusing on the diminished political capital toward the end of presidential terms); Charles M. Cameron et al., Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees: A Neoinstitutional Model, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 525, 528 (1990) (discussing constraints on
Presidents toward the ends of their terms); Krutz et al., supra note 185, at 878 (finding that presidential
approval ratings often influence the success of judicial nominations); McCarty & Razaghian, supra note
185, at 1139–41 (noting that Presidents are more likely to succeed in judicial appointments toward the
beginning of their terms in office).
190
NEMACHECK, supra note 181, at 70–71.
191
See EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 184, at 108; NEMACHECK, supra note 181, at 80; Timothy R.
Johnson & Jason M. Roberts, Pivotal Politics, Presidential Capital, and Supreme Court Nominations,
32 CONGRESS & PRESIDENCY 31, 38 (2005); Moraski & Shipan, supra note 181, at 1088–90. But cf.
Binder & Maltzman, supra note 185, at 197 (“[P]opular presidents are no more able to get their nominees approved quickly than less popular ones . . . .”).
192
See EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 184, at 108–09 (“Simply stated, when an appointee is likely to
tip the ideological balance of a circuit, senators are more likely to drag their feet over the confirmation.”); P.S. Ruckman, Jr., The Supreme Court, Critical Nominations, and the Senate Confirmation
Process, 55 J. POL. 793, 797–98 (1993). One prominent example of a noncritical appointment was the
replacement of Chief Justice William Rehnquist with his former law clerk, John G. Roberts, both of
whom were appointed by Republican Presidents.
187
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Such scrutiny occurs most often when a President replaces judges appointed
by a different party. As P.S. Ruckman has noted, nearly 60% of all unsuccessful nominations to the Supreme Court have involved attempted opposite-party replacements.193 An opposite-party replacement to the Supreme
Court is defined as critical when it would result in a one-member partisan
split (i.e., a 5-4 continuing majority with a high possibility of swing voting),
create a partisan deadlock, or establish a new partisan majority on the
Court.194 In other words, opposite-party replacements are critical when
“they involve the added possibility of having a substantial impact on the
partisan balance” of a court,195 such as when President Nixon nominated
Harry Blackmun to fill the seat vacated by Democratic-appointee Abe Fortas.196 Indeed, not only is it more difficult for a President to successfully
confirm a nominee when a critical nomination arises, but according to
Charles Shipan and Megan Shannon, such a nomination also results in
greater delay than with noncritical nominations.197
2. The Power of Strategic Selection.—Despite those constraints, a
substantial body of empirical research demonstrates that strategic selection
of nominees by the President can dramatically improve the chances of confirmation, even when the opposing party controls the Senate. We discuss
three aspects of this strategy: (1) the selection of highly qualified nominees,
(2) the selection of ideologically moderate nominees, and (3) prenomination consultation with the Senate. Strikingly, the selection of highly
qualified nominees has been the President’s single most effective tactic,
even in cases where such nominees are ideologically distant from the pivot
point in the Senate.
First, empirical work by Lee Epstein, among others, demonstrates that
the qualifications of Supreme Court nominees can have a dramatic impact
on the likelihood of confirmation.198 In studying the votes of every senator
193

See Ruckman, supra note 192, at 797.
See Charles R. Shipan & Megan L. Shannon, Delaying Justice(s): A Duration Analysis of Supreme Court Confirmations, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 654, 661 (2003).
195
Ruckman, supra note 192, at 798.
196
See id. at 797. It bears noting that, consistent with the hypothesis that critical nominations tend
to lead to greater conflict between the President and the Senate, President Nixon’s first two nominees to
fill the Fortas vacancy—Clement Haynsworth, Jr. and G. Harrold Carswell—were both rejected by the
Senate. See id.
197
See Shipan & Shannon, supra note 194, at 665. But cf. Binder & Maltzman, supra note 185, at
197 (finding that critical nominations at the lower court level only lead to greater delay when there is
divided government).
198
See EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 184, at 69; Lee Epstein et al., The Role of Qualifications in
the Confirmation of Nominees to the U.S. Supreme Court, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1145, 1148 (2005); see
also Cameron et al., supra note 189, at 530 (finding that the qualifications of a nominee are “equally
important” to the “ideological distance between senators and nominees”); Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court
Confirmations Are As Messy As They Should Be, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 11, 2005, at B6, B7 (reviewing the available research and concluding that “[q]ualifications matter—as much today as they have
in the past”).
194
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on every Supreme Court nominee since the middle of the twentieth century—2451 votes in all—Epstein and Segal found that “a highly qualified
nominee would receive about forty-five more votes (on average) than one
universally deemed unqualified.”199 In an earlier study, Charles Cameron,
Albert Cover, and Jeffrey Segal analyzed 2054 confirmation votes from
Earl Warren to Anthony Kennedy and similarly discovered that it is “overwhelmingly” the interaction of qualifications and the ideology of nominees
that “determines the votes of senators.”200 Recent experience tends to corroborate those findings. For example, it is not a stretch to say that Harriet
Miers may have been confirmed to the Supreme Court had she been seen
both by the public and the Senate as highly qualified, rather than just a close
confidante and crony of President George W. Bush.201 Likewise, due to the
criticality of the nomination to replace departing Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor, it is fair to speculate that Samuel Alito may have faced a filibuster or an unfavorable Senate vote had he not served previously with distinction as a Third Circuit judge, United States Attorney, and Supreme Court
advocate in the Solicitor General’s office.202
Second, senators are more likely to vote for a nominee who shares or
approximates their own political ideology than for a nominee who is ideologically distant.203 According to Epstein and Segal, a Supreme Court
nominee receives only about 57% of the votes of ideologically distant senators, while an ideologically congruent nominee receives 98% of the possible
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EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 184, at 103. To measure a nominee’s qualifications, the study
used a technique that examines the content of newspaper editorials about Supreme Court nominees that
were written between the time of their nomination and their confirmation vote in the Senate. See id.
Although the newspapers examined in the study reflected rough ideological balance, one wonders the
extent to which a nominee’s ideological views may have influenced a newspaper’s assessment of that
nominee’s qualifications. For example, we wonder whether Robert Bork received a less favorable
evaluation of his credentials because many senators, including Edward Kennedy, had already characterized his jurisprudence as outside of the mainstream of legal thought. Indeed, according to the study,
Bork was the tenth least qualified nominee, whereas Lewis Powell, who had never been a judge before
his nomination to the Supreme Court, tied for the most qualified nominee since 1953. See id. at 105.
Although any further discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, we would hypothesize
that Epstein and Segal’s methodology overstates the influence of qualifications on a nominee’s prospects for confirmation, though we have no doubt that a nominee’s qualifications play a highly influential
role in the votes of senators.
200
See Cameron et al., supra note 189, at 530–31. The Cameron, Cover, and Segal study also used
newspaper editorials to measure both the ideology and qualifications of Supreme Court nominees. Id. at
529. It measured senators’ ideology using the ratings assigned by a liberal interest group, Americans for
Democratic Action. Id.
201
See, e.g., Linda Feldmann, Religious Right’s Hard Call, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 22,
2007, at 1 (noting the concerns about Harriet Miers’s qualifications to sit on the Supreme Court).
202
See, e.g., Ferrell Bount, Op-Ed., The Real Samuel Alito: Judge Is Most Qualified Supreme Court
Nominee in Seven Decades, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Jan. 20, 2006, at 10A (noting that the ABA gave
Samuel Alito “the highest rating possible” with respect to his qualifications).
203
See EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 184, at 109.
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votes.204 Cameron, Cover, and Segal similarly observed that the votes of
senators are “decisively affected” by the ideological distance between a
senator and a Supreme Court nominee.205 Although operationalizing the political views of nominees and senators can be difficult, and there is vigorous
scholarly debate over the role that political considerations ought to play in
the Senate’s evaluation of Supreme Court nominees,206 there is no doubt that
a President can improve the odds of confirmation by selecting nominees
with ideological appeal to senators of the opposition party.
Eisgruber makes a similar point in defense of his proposal to select
moderates for the Supreme Court, noting that Presidents have had more difficulty winning confirmation for their nominees when they have chosen extremists.207 As an initial matter, most empirical work in this area employs a
conventional definition of moderation that situates Justices along an ideological continuum with other members of the Court. It is therefore unclear
the extent to which the existing empirical evidence on judicial ideology
supports Eisgruber’s claim that moderates, as he defines them, would enjoy
greater rates of confirmation.208 Even so, Eisgruber goes further, making
clear that he would not be satisfied with the selection of moderates for
merely tactical reasons.209 His proposal calls for senators to block extremists from reaching the Court even in cases of unified government where
concessions to opposition senators are unnecessary, which is unrealistic
given the dynamics of confirmation politics.210
204

See id. at 113. Like Cameron, Cover, and Segal, the Epstein and Segal book also used the scores
assigned by Americans for Democratic Action to measure the ideology of senators. Id. at 111; see supra
note 200.
205
See Cameron et al., supra note 189, at 530.
206
Compare TRIBE, supra note 9, at 132–33 (arguing that the Senate and the President should be
“equal partner[s]” and that it is perfectly permissible for senators to consider the ideology of judicial
nominees), and Paulsen, supra note 144, at 552 (“Far from forbidding inquiries into judicial ideology,
we should give free rein to ideology in the battle over judicial appointments.”), with, John C. Eastman,
The Limited Nature of the Senate’s Advice and Consent Role, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 633, 646–47
(2003) (stating that, in the Founders’ views, the role of the Senate in the appointments process was quite
limited), and Bruce Fein, A Circumscribed Senate Confirmation Role, 102 HARV. L. REV. 672, 687
(1989) (asserting that, in Bork’s confirmation, “[t]he Senate should have confined its investigation to
determining whether the nominee was intellectually competent and whether his nomination was tainted
by cronyism, corruption, or crass political partisanship”).
207
EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 156.
208
As stated above, Eisgruber employs an idiosyncratic definition of “moderate” that has two principle features: special solicitude toward claims of the disadvantaged and a thoughtful understanding of
the limits of the judicial role. See EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 121; supra notes 68–76 and accompanying text.
209
EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 179.
210
See Moraski & Shipan, supra note 181, at 1075–76. According to a leading game-theoretic
model developed by Moraski and Shipan, the President is generally unconstrained in making appointments to the Supreme Court during periods of unified government and when the Court’s median is to the
right or the left of both the Senate and the President. Under such circumstances, the Senate will accept
any nominee that moves the ideological median of the Court in the direction that it prefers. See id. (de-
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Moreover, several studies suggest that highly qualified nominees are
difficult for the Senate to reject, even when they are ideologically distant
from the median pivot of the Senate. Highly qualified nominees to the Supreme Court between 1953 and 2005 received a staggering 99.3% of a possible 602 votes from ideologically compatible senators.211 For nominees
deemed “not qualified,” that number drops to 91.8%.212 For those nominees
who are ideologically distant from senators, the difference could not be
more stark: well-qualified nominees received 94.8% of the possible 231
votes, while those nominees deemed not qualified received only 1.7% of a
possible 115 votes.213 It is for these reasons that Timothy Johnson and Jason Roberts conclude that “presidents have a greater deal of power over the
nomination process—even when they face ideological constraints in the
Senate—and that they use this power to gain confirmation for their preferred choices.”214 Although there is evidence that ideological compatibility
has become a stronger predictor of confirmation since the 1950s, qualifications have remained consistently influential for more than a century.215 The
numbers speak for themselves: despite recent difficulty in gaining confirmation for some lower court nominees, only four Supreme Court nominees
have been rejected by the Senate since 1900, while fifty-five have been approved.216
Third, pre-nomination consultation with senators when forming the
short list of candidates to fill a Supreme Court vacancy can reduce the degree of opposition that Presidents face.217 According to Nemacheck, “[b]y
scribing the President as “unconstrained” under those circumstances). The failed nomination of Harriet
Miers appears to be inconsistent with that prediction, perhaps because of Moraski and Shipan’s assumption of a single-period game. See id. at 1072; supra note 179 and accompanying text (describing the
Miers nomination). Neither the political science literature nor the Miers nomination, however, offers
any support for the scenario envisioned by Eisgruber, in which the Senate rejects ideologically attractive
nominees on the ground that they are not moderate enough.
211
See EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 184, at 114.
212
Id.
213
Id.
214
Johnson & Roberts, supra note 191, at 44.
215
Lee Epstein et al., The Changing Dynamics of Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees, 68 J.
POL. 296, 302 (2006) (noting that while the influence of qualifications on confirmation have remained
fairly steady, ideology has become a more important aspect of the Senate’s consideration of nominees
since the 1950s).
216
See Moraski & Shipan, supra note 181, at 1069. One possible partial explanation for these results is that the President enjoys the exclusive power to make the next nomination. Because the President alone chooses nominees to the Supreme Court, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, senators must always
consider whether expending significant resources to defeat a nominee will prompt the President to
choose someone equally objectionable, or even worse. See Johnson & Roberts, supra note 191, at 45
n.11 (discussing “the iterative nature of the nomination game” and suggesting that the fact that the game
“potentially has many rounds” helps to explain why even when the President’s party lacks a filibusterproof majority in the Senate, Presidents have greater success in securing nomination than spatial models
of ideological distance would otherwise predict).
217
See WITTES, supra note 13, at 115, 119.
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listening to members of Congress in developing his short list, the president
might be seen as being conciliatory in terms of his deliberations, which in
turn could help establish a more favorable nomination environment.”218
Even if the President does not ultimately select a senator’s suggested nominee, senators appreciate consultation because it “can bolster their image
both within the chamber and with their constituents.”219 Such consultation
can be especially effective when the President faces divided government,220
there is enough opposition to filibuster a nominee,221 or presidential capital
is especially low.222 For example, President Clinton’s two Supreme Court
nominees, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer, enjoyed relatively
smooth confirmations in part because President Clinton consulted informally with the ranking Republican on the Senate Judiciary Committee,
Orrin Hatch, prior to nominating them.223
The available research thus demonstrates that the strategic selection of
nominees can weaken resistance from senators. Choosing a highly qualified individual, paying attention to a nominee’s political views, and prenomination consultation with key senators can put pressure on the opposing
party and increase the odds of confirmation, even during periods of divided
government.224 Proponents of a “get tough” plan for the Senate should not
underestimate the President’s power to frame the confirmation debate by
strategically selecting nominees that are difficult for the Senate to reject.
B. “Going Public” and the Use of the Bully Pulpit
Even after selecting nominees, the President has considerable institutional strength in influencing the confirmation of nominees. One powerful
tool the President can use to smooth the path to confirmation is “going public” or using the bully pulpit to tout the qualifications and attributes of
nominees. Empirical research suggests that Presidents have deployed this
218

NEMACHECK, supra note 181, at 40.
Id. at 40–41.
220
See id. at 65–66.
221
See id. at 67.
222
See id. at 70–71.
223
See ORRIN HATCH, SQUARE PEG: CONFESSIONS OF A CITIZEN SENATOR 180 (2002);
NEMACHECK, supra note 181, at 41; Richard J. Durbin, No Constitutional Right to a Rubber Stamp,
39 U. RICH. L. REV. 989, 998–99 (2005); Timothy R. Johnson & Jason M. Roberts, Presidential Capital
and the Supreme Court Confirmation Process, 66 J. POL. 663, 664 n.3 (2004).
224
Of course, the research demonstrates only that these techniques have been successful in the past,
not that they will be in the future. An important part of Eisgruber’s project is to explain to senators and
the public that, although “[l]egal acumen and experience are obviously important,” presidential claims
about the qualifications of their nominees are often unreliable, and in any event, a focus on qualifications is inappropriate because “judging is not like umpiring.” EISGRUBER, supra note 6, at 16. We suspect, however, that the Senate’s strong tendency to confirm highly qualified nominees has not resulted
from a naïve and mistaken belief among senators that Supreme Court decisionmaking is entirely technical and nonpolitical. Instead, for instance, concerns about the legitimacy of the Court and respect for the
rule of law might lead senators to prefer highly respected and accomplished nominees.
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strategy most frequently when their nominees are imperiled, but it can also
be influential to further entrench support for nominees who would otherwise be confirmed.
The benefits and risks of the using the bully pulpit are apparent in the
legislative arena, where the President plays an active role in setting “both
the public agenda and the congressional agenda.”225 Ronald Reagan, for instance, won important budget battles “early in his first term by imploring”
that citizens “contact [their] senators and congressmen.”226 Unlike most
senators and members of Congress, Presidents have the attention of the entire country and thus can influence the legislative agenda by “go[ing] over
the heads” of other political figures and making their appeals to the general
public.227 With respect to ordinary legislation, one risk of using the bully
pulpit too often is that it can eliminate bargaining options for both the
President and Congress.228 As Johnson and Roberts have observed, once
Presidents have “draw[n] a line in the sand” on some policy or budgetary
initiative, it is often difficult for them to continue to bargain without appearing as if they have capitulated to congressional demands.229 Johnson and
Roberts further explain that “going public” can be a risky strategy because
it uses precious political capital and is not always successful.230 For instance, President George H.W. Bush used the bully pulpit to try to influence
congressional consideration of his budget proposals, but that approach
failed miserably with the Democratic Congress.231
The use of the bully pulpit in contested confirmation battles can be a
powerful weapon for the President. Before the twentieth century, Presidents were reluctant to speak out publicly about their policies or judicial
nominees out of fear that they would be perceived as demagogues.232 Once
the Seventeenth Amendment was passed in 1913 and senators became more
accountable to the general public,233 Presidents increasingly used the power
of public persuasion to “mold mandates for policy initiatives.”234 Even after
the use of the bully pulpit became more common for legislation, however,
Presidents still hesitated to use public appeals for judicial nominees.235
Presidents eagerly wanted to avoid being perceived as “stooping to ‘poli225

Johnson & Roberts, supra note 223, at 665.
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See id.
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See id. at 666.
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See id.
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See John Anthony Maltese, The Presidency and the Judiciary, in THE PRESIDENCY AND THE
POLITICAL SYSTEM 499, 513–14 (Michael Nelson ed., 6th ed. 2000); JEFFREY K. TULIS, THE
RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 95 (1987).
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tics’” in order to have their judicial nominees confirmed.236 In one prominent example, Herbert Hoover desperately desired to publicly support his
doomed Supreme Court nominee, John J. Parker, in 1930 but ultimately decided against it.237 Although Presidents such as Harry Truman and Dwight
Eisenhower spoke publicly about some of their Supreme Court nominees,238
Ronald Reagan was the first President to make widespread use of the bully
pulpit in the judicial appointments context. Indeed, President Reagan made
a whopping seventy public statements in favor of Robert H. Bork, greater
than the total number of public statements made in favor of Supreme Court
nominees by all of the Presidents that preceded Reagan.239
In a recent study, Timothy Johnson and Jason Roberts examined the
conditions under which Presidents are most likely to “go public” in support
of their Supreme Court nominees. According to the study, Presidents are
most likely to make public statements when a nominee is ideologically distant from the Senate’s filibuster pivot, the Supreme Court’s median Justice
is ideologically distant from the pivotal senator, and the President and Senate fall on opposite ends of the ideological spectrum.240 In fact, Presidents
are “almost five times more likely to go public to fight for their chosen
nominee” to the Supreme Court when their nominees are ideologically distant from the Senate.241 Presidents will also release “almost three times as
many public statements when their nominee will not move the Court median ideologically closer to the pivotal Senator.”242 Therefore, Presidents
tend to use the bully pulpit most often when they are “ideologically constrained by the Senate.”243 Most importantly, the Johnson and Roberts study
demonstrates that the strategy works with respect to Supreme Court nominees: Presidents who publicly support their nominees are likely to reduce
the number of “nay” votes actually cast as compared to the number of such
votes estimated by predictive models that are based on ideological dis-
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See id. Instead, Presidents often used surrogates to make a public case for their judicial nominees. See id. at 516. For instance, Woodrow Wilson used Norman Hapgood, the editor of Harper’s
Weekly, to publicly tout Supreme Court nominee Louis Brandeis in 1916. See id. Richard Nixon also
made aggressive use of his new Office of Communications to publicly support the unsuccessful nomination of Clement Haynsworth in 1969. See id.
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See id. at 514.
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See Johnson & Roberts, supra note 223, at 672.
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See id.
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Id. at 669–70, 675–78. Johnson and Roberts used Segal/Cover scores, derived from newspaper
editorials, to measure the ideology of Supreme Court nominees. Id. at 673. It used DW-NOMINATE
scores, based on nearly all roll-call Senate votes, to measure the filibuster pivot of the Senate. Id. at 673
& nn.19–20; see KEITH POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY
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tance.244 For example, Johnson and Roberts surmise that absent President
George H.W. Bush’s twenty-nine public statements of support, Justice Clarence Thomas would not have been confirmed by the Senate.245
There are, of course, exceptions. Robert Bork’s nomination was
soundly defeated despite numerous public statements by President Ronald
Reagan,246 and Harriet Miers’s nomination failed despite immediate public
statements of support by President George W. Bush.247 Therefore, supportive statements by the President certainly do not guarantee confirmation for
a Supreme Court nominee.248 Nonetheless, the empirical evidence demonstrates that robust use of the bully pulpit can lead to more favorable out-
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Id. at 679. Although Presidents have enjoyed remarkable success in going public in support of
Supreme Court nominees, they have not been nearly as successful in using the bully pulpit in support of
nominees to the lower federal courts. See Lisa M. Holmes, Presidential Strategy in the Judicial Appointment Process: “Going Public” in Support of Nominees to the U.S. Court of Appeals, 35 AM. POL.
RES. 567, 586 (2007). Lisa Holmes hypothesizes that this distinction may exist because there is a “‘reservoir of goodwill’ that stymies effective mobilization against Supreme Court nominees,” while going
public in support of lower court nominees can in some instances entrench ideological opposition against
them. Id. at 588 (quoting James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Politicized Confirmation Processes
and the Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court (Apr. 17, 2006) (paper presented at the 64th Annual National Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association), available at http://www.allacademic.
com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/3/9/3/5/pages139352/p139352-1.php).
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See Johnson & Roberts, supra note 223, at 679.
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Despite making seventy statements in favor of Robert Bork—so many that “it seemed that the
president would use virtually any public forum to push his nominee, whether signing a proclamation for
National Hispanic Heritage Week or German American Day”—the nomination ultimately failed by a
58-42 margin. See Maltese, supra note 232, at 514. Bork’s nomination failed due, at least in part, to the
ideological distance between Bork and the Democratic Senate, the criticality of the nomination to replace swing vote Lewis Powell, Bork’s remarkably candid answers to questions by members of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and the late date at which the vacancy arose during Reagan’s second term. See
NEMACHECK, supra note 181, at 70; Cameron et al., supra note 189, at 528; Fein, supra note 206, at
676–77, 683.
247
President Bush went public to support Miers the day after the nomination “to quell a revolt
within his own party . . . in the face of Republican complaints that he ha[d] drifted from his ideological
moorings.” Peter Baker & Shailagh Murray, Bush Defends Supreme Court Pick, WASH. POST, Oct. 5,
2005, at A1. He made additional statements of support on at least four subsequent occasions over the
next three weeks, before the nomination was eventually withdrawn. See Charles Babington, After the
Home Run, a White House Balk?; Handling of Miers Nomination Cannot Stand Up to Ease of Roberts
Approval, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2005, at A4; Peter Baker & Dan Balz, Bush Rejects Calls to Withdraw
Miers, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2005, at A8; Peter Baker & Charles Babington, Role of Religion Emerges as
Issue, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2005, at A8; Michael A. Fletcher & Charles Babington, Conservatives Escalate Opposition to Miers, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 2005, at A2.
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Timothy R. Johnson & Jason M. Roberts, Supplemental Materials: Presidential Capital
and the Supreme Court Confirmation Process 8 (Aug. 2004), http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/files/
ks7ZPa/johnson%20supplements.pdf (supplementing Johnson & Roberts, supra note 223, and acknowledging that the authors’ theory “cannot explain” the Senate’s rejection of Bork, but maintaining that “no
theory is perfect, and the fact that we are able to say, with confidence, that 25 of the last 26 Supreme
Court nominees have been helped by presidents willing to go public on their behalf is a very important
finding both theoretically and substantively”).
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comes for Supreme Court nominees, especially in cases where a nomination
faces stiff resistance from the Senate.249
C. Recess Appointments
Presidents also possess other tools to persuade the Senate to confirm an
embattled nominee. One of the most important is the power to temporarily
circumvent the process altogether by exercising their constitutional power
to “fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate,
by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.”250 Although there is a robust debate in the scholarly literature about
the meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause,251 every circuit that has
considered the question has held that Presidents possess the power to recess
appoint federal judges to Article III courts, including during intrasession recesses of the Congress.252 As the Eleventh Circuit held in considering
President George W. Bush’s recess appointment of William Pryor, Jr. to
that court, while there is some tension between the Article III requirement
of life tenure and the recess appointment power, “the temporary judges appointed under the Recess Appointments Clause are an exception to the general rule of Article III.”253 Recess appointees, the court held, are “afforded
the full extent of the authority commensurate with” the office during the
249

Eisgruber argues that “it would be a mistake to ignore the power of ideas” because “[p]ublic understandings of the appointments process will affect how that process is conducted.” EISGRUBER, supra
note 6, at 16. Eisgruber may be correct that over the long term, books like The Next Justice might blunt
the effectiveness of the bully pulpit by directing the public’s attention to a sophisticated understanding
of judicial philosophy rather than a nominee’s qualifications and public support—the subjects of public
statements by the President that have proven effective. See Johnson & Roberts, supra note 223, at 671.
It is difficult to imagine, however, given the institutional advantages of the Presidency in defining the
public debate surrounding Supreme Court nominations, that abstract notions of judicial philosophy and
moderation will come to dominate discussions about judicial nominees.
250
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
251
In interpreting the text of the Clause, scholars have focused on two major questions: first,
whether the vacancy to be filled must actually arise or merely exist during the recess of the Senate; second, whether the power may be exercised only during intersession recesses of Congress or whether it
also applies to intrasession recesses. Although the courts are unanimous that the President’s power is
extremely broad with respect to both questions, see infra note 252 and accompanying text, scholars are
still debating the scope of the power. See, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, Recess Appointments of Article III
Judges: Three Constitutional Questions, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 377 (2005); William Ty Mayton, Recess
Appointments and an Independent Judiciary, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 515 (2004); Steven M. Pyser, Recess Appointments to the Federal Judiciary: An Unconstitutional Transformation of Senate Advice and
Consent, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 61 (2006); Michael B. Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess
Appointments Clause, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1487 (2005); Note, Recess Appointments to the Supreme Court:
Constitutional but Unwise?, 10 STAN. L. REV. 124 (1957). Due to the unanimity of the federal courts on
the constitutionality of recess appointments for federal judges and the rich scholarship on the subject,
any further discussion of the constitutionality of the Recess Appointments Clause is beyond the scope of
this Review Essay.
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See Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220, 1226–27 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Woodley,
751 F.2d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 712 (2d Cir. 1962).
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pendency of the recess appointment.254 The text of the Clause makes clear,
however, that recess appointees may only serve for a limited time. For example, an individual that is appointed by the President during a recess occurring in the middle of the first session of Congress will be eligible to
serve until the end of the second session, which is likely to be late in the
following year.255
Although Presidents have been less willing to appoint judges using recess appointments over the past forty years,256 there is a rich history of aggressive use of the power to reshape the federal Judiciary. Over the course
of American history, Presidents have made 248 recess appointments to federal district courts, 43 to the federal circuit courts, and 12 to the Supreme
Court of the United States.257 Few remember that President Dwight Eisenhower employed the power liberally, recess appointing Chief Justice Earl
Warren and Justices William Brennan and Potter Stewart prior to confirmation by the Senate.258 Eisenhower used the recess appointment power strategically to appoint each right before a national election.259 Other Presidents
254

Id.
T.J. HALSTEAD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ORDER CODE RL33009, RECESS APPOINTMENTS: A
LEGAL OVERVIEW (2005), available at http://opencrs.cdt.org/rpts/RL33009_20050726.pdf. The records
of the Founding era provide little information about the scope or operation of the Clause. Alexander
Hamilton in The Federalist No. 67 implies that the purpose of the power was primarily pragmatic:
The ordinary power of appointment is confided to the President and Senate jointly, and can therefore only be exercised during the session of the Senate; but, as it would have been improper to
oblige this body to be continually in session for the appointment of officers; and as vacancies
might happen in their recess, which it might be necessary for the public service to fill without delay, the succeeding clause is evidently intended to authorize the president, singly, to make temporary appointments “during the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at
the end of their next session.”
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THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, at 346 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 1948).
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Maclaine at the North Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 29, 1788), in 4 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION 102–03 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987); Proceedings of the Pennsylvania
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months at a time. See Rappaport, supra note 251, at 1500–01.
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Pryor (Eleventh Circuit). See LOUIS FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ORDER CODE RL31112, RECESS
APPOINTMENT OF FEDERAL JUDGES 19 (2001), available at http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/
pdf/RL31112.pdf; Henry B. Hogue, The Law: Recess Appointments to Article III Courts,
34 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 656, 659 (2004).
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id/1002994.
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have also used the power “for political purposes,” including George Washington, who recess appointed John Rutledge to the post of Chief Justice of
the United States in 1795, though Washington’s use of the power “generated significant controversy” and ultimately played a role in the Senate’s rejection of Rutledge’s nomination.260 Indeed, the first five Presidents used
the power a total of thirty-one times to appoint judges, including the appointment of five Supreme Court Justices.261
Not surprisingly, the primary institutional opponent to robust use of the
recess appointment power has been the Senate, which has often viewed the
power as circumventing the Senate’s advice and consent role in the appointments process. For instance, in response to President Eisenhower’s
aggressive use of the power to appoint three Justices to the Supreme
Court,262 the Senate passed a resolution in 1960 stating that recess appointments to the Court “may not be wholly consistent with the best interests of
the Supreme Court . . . and that such appointments, therefore, should not be
made except under unusual circumstances and for the purpose of preventing
or ending a demonstrable breakdown in the administration of the Court’s
business.”263 Later, in 1985 and 1986, Senate Minority Leader Robert Byrd
objected to President Reagan’s recess appointments to executive agencies
during brief, intrasession recesses of the Senate.264 Byrd threatened to suspend Senate action on nearly every pending nomination, including 5700
military promotions, but the White House averted the conflict by agreeing
to provide notice to the Senate in advance of future recess appointments.265
Senator James Inhofe likewise threatened to place a hold on President Clinton’s judicial nominations in 1999 in response to several of Clinton’s recess
appointments,266 but a showdown was again prevented when Trent Lott, the
Senate Majority Leader at the time, failed to support Inhofe’s proposed
moratorium.267
Recently, the Senate has moved aggressively to block the President
from making recess appointments. In 2007, Senate Majority Leader Harry
Reid scheduled pro forma sessions of Congress during periods of traditional
Senate recess in order to prevent President George W. Bush from making
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recess appointments to the executive and judicial branches.268 While it remains to be seen whether Senator Reid’s strategy can be sustained, or even
become routine over the long term, it goes without saying that robust exercise of the recess appointment power by Presidents is risky because it can
generate powerful, negative responses from Congress.
Surprisingly, presidential use of the recess appointment power, even on
executive branch appointments, is one of the most understudied and lightly
theorized issues in the literature about the Presidency.269 In light of historic
Senate opposition to robust use of the recess appointment power, Presidents
must be careful, particularly with respect to the timing of the appointment.270 As Henry Hogue has observed, recess appointments during intrasession recesses have been more controversial than those during intersession
recesses, and it is therefore unsurprising that of the more than three hundred
recess appointments to Article III courts, only fourteen have been made during an intrasession recess.271
Recess appointments during brief recesses, whether intra- or intersession, have also led to greater interbranch conflict.272 Perhaps the most
aggressive use of recess appointments was by President Theodore Roosevelt, who appointed more than 160 individuals to various nonjudicial posts
during what he called a “constructive recess” between two sessions of Congress, even though “there was no break in time between the two sessions.”273 President Roosevelt’s appointments stirred quite a bit of
controversy and the Senate Judiciary Committee emphatically rejected the
notion of a “constructive recess” in a report it published approximately
fourteen months later.274 Similarly, President Bush’s appointment of Judge
Pryor during a ten-day recess in 2004 angered many Democratic senators,
though the Senate eventually confirmed Pryor because of the agreement
reached by the Gang of Fourteen.275
268

See Sean Lengell, Senate Democrats Play Recess Hardball, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2007, at
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Nonetheless, recess appointments are a powerful tool that may enable
Presidents to overcome resistance in the Senate in two ways. First, recess
appointments can help to overcome a Senate filibuster by temporarily circumventing the process and placing the nominee directly on the bench.
Presidents can also threaten a recess appointment in response to senatorial
obstruction, reducing delays and forcing a vote on stalled nominations.
Second, the performance of a nominee during a recess appointment might
improve the prospects for confirmation. A recess appointee who serves
with distinction and avoids controversy during a brief stint on the bench can
make a powerful case for her own confirmation.276 The Senate might shift
from a searching review of a nominee’s qualifications and ideology to her
actual performance over the course of a short judicial career.277 To be sure,
the strategy is risky. Recess appointing an ideologically objectionable
judge risks angering opposition party senators and, as a result, may actually
solidify opposition and make the prospects for confirmation more difficult.278 History has shown, however, that in some circumstances recess appointments can be a powerful option for Presidents.
None of these observations should be understood as an endorsement,
implicit or otherwise, of the practice of recess appointing Supreme Court
Justices. As a descriptive matter, however, the ability to make strategic recess appointments remains a powerful tool for Presidents who wish to influence confirmation politics or encourage Senate action on judicial
nominees. That Presidents have the constitutional power to unilaterally
(though temporarily) appoint Supreme Court Justices illustrates the difficulty that senators may encounter when attempting to “get tough” with respect to Supreme Court nominations.
D. Legislative Tactics
Finally, Presidents can use legislative tactics to influence the judicial
appointments process. Specifically, Presidents have the power to veto, or to
threaten to veto, ordinary legislation if the Senate fails to confirm a nominee to the Supreme Court. They can also resort to the distinctively legislative practice of trading political favors, also known as “logrolling.”279
These strategies would be controversial, but as Eisgruber recognizes, the
276
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stakes of Supreme Court nominations are enormous.280 If the Senate were
to “get tough,” as he suggests, we would expect the President to consider all
available options in response.
With respect to nominations to the lower courts, the Senate has already
begun to employ parliamentary tactics like the filibuster and legislative
practices like vote logrolling. As Senator Orrin Hatch has noted, logrolling
has become
[the] norm. Today, votes on nominees are often traded like commodities—ten
judges in exchange for a vote on this, two commissioners for a vote on that.
This objectionable practice is so common and accepted that it has become as
important in keeping the Senate functioning as unanimous consent and other
key parliamentary rules.281

Justice Breyer, for instance, reportedly received his nomination to the First
Circuit in exchange for Senator Edward Kennedy’s support of President
Jimmy Carter’s efforts to secure a second presidential term.282 Although
there is little evidence that logrolling exists in the appointment of Supreme
Court Justices, such behavior would not be surprising in light of Senator
Hatch’s recognition that it has become an important, even common, aspect
of the judicial appointments process.
The President’s most powerful source of leverage in the legislative
process, however, is the presidential veto.283 From 1789 to 1992, Congress
has overridden just 7% of the 1448 presidential vetoes, meaning that Presidents are highly effective when they elect to use the veto pen.284
Two dominant, game-theoretic models describe presidential use of veto
threats.285 The first is the coordination model, in which Congress possesses
280
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uncertainty about the President’s ideal policy point.286 In this model, if
Congress views a President’s public veto threat as credible and is uncertain
about the President’s ideal policy point, “the majority will meet the president’s demands as far as possible to circumvent a veto.”287 Under this scenario, “the president may choose to object publicly to many more
legislative provisions than he actually opposes in order to maximize potential concessions.”288 Without delving into the minutiae of the coordination
model, it is sufficient to say here that the model successfully explains executive-legislative bargaining as an empirical matter, primarily because it
provides a rationale for why “presidents are typically not compelled to actually apply vetoes to threatened legislation” on every occasion.289
An example from the presidency of George H.W. Bush nicely illustrates the coordination model. In 1989, President Bush proposed legislation
providing federal support for child care through tax credits for families with
children under the age of four.290 At the time, Democrats held an eightyfive seat advantage in the House of Representatives and a ten seat advantage in the Senate.291 Democrats, not surprisingly, championed a different
proposal, the Act for Better Child Care (ABC), which would have funded
child care through block grants to states, creating a new federal entitlement
and strict guidelines for child care providers.292 As the ABC bill was being
debated in the Senate, President Bush launched a veto threat through Senate
Majority Leader Bob Dole, who stated that “the president’s advisors would
recommend a veto unless the contested provisions, including the grants to
parents, [were] dropped.”293 After a great deal of negotiation between Congress and the White House, President Bush finally signed a version of the
lation it “can be seen as a commitment designed to shore up the president’s informal powers of persuasion.” Rebecca E. Deen & Laura W. Arnold, Veto Threats as a Policy Tool: When to Threaten?,
32 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 30, 33 (2002). For a President, however, “reneging on a veto threat might
entail electoral retaliation or cost the president in the court of public opinion.” Richard S. Conley,
George Bush and the 102d Congress: The Impact of Public and “Private” Veto Threats on Policy Outcomes, 33 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 730, 732 (2003). The costs to the President of reneging on a veto
threat also enhance the credibility of the threat in the view of Congress, meaning that it may not attempt
to pass the legislation if the President has made a credible veto threat. See id. A more thorough discussion of the commitment model is omitted because, to date, the available empirical data on veto bargaining is not supportive of its explanatory power.
286
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bill in November of 1991 that funded the program primarily through tax
credits, but also required states to create licensing standards for child care
providers and provided a $2.5 billion block grant to states to be used for
poor families.294 The strategic use of a veto threat enabled the Bush Administration to eliminate portions of the bill that it opposed while still fulfilling one of Bush’s chief campaign promises—all without ever actually
using the veto pen.295
A second model, the blame-game model, provides an explanation for
when the coordination model fails. This model explains interbranch relations when Congress seeks to intentionally provoke a veto in order to lessen
the public approval ratings of the President.296 The model has particular explanatory power in election years or when the majority in Congress attempts to pass legislation that is particularly popular with the public.297
Congress engages in this game because preliminary evidence does in fact
demonstrate that presidential approval ratings drop following a veto.298 An
interesting, recent example of blame-game politics is the Democratic rhetoric regarding President George W. Bush’s recent veto of the popular State
Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) legislation, which is popular
even among Republican voters and has generated widespread negative press
for the Administration.299
Both models demonstrate, to varying degrees, that Presidents wield the
veto power in order to influence the legislative process and set the congressional agenda. The scholarly literature, however, is devoid of any discussion of using veto threats to influence the judicial appointments process.
That absence might be explained by the binary nature of senators’ votes on
a judicial nominee. Unlike ordinary legislation, a confirmation vote is not
subject to a presidential veto, and the Senate either votes yea or nay on the
nominee. As with recess appointments, however, the President can use veto
threats as an antifilibuster strategy. Senators may be inclined to oppose a
Supreme Court nominee but might also fear that the President’s veto could
delay or permanently shelve legislation they consider crucial to their
chances for re-election. As Richard Conley noted with respect to President
George H.W. Bush’s Administration, veto threats were “quite successful in
294
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exacting concessions from the congressional majority.”300 A President with
a larger strategic view can use public or private veto threats to encourage
senators to support judicial nominees in exchange for a promise not to veto
a piece of favored legislation. Of course, as the coordination and commitment models require, a President must make a credible threat to veto legislation or the threat will be ignored by the Congress. For instance, a veto
threat by President George W. Bush on a bill to generously increase spending on the Iraq War would not be seen as particularly credible by Congress,
but a veto threat on a piece of entitlement legislation might well be.
For Presidents, this strategy is not without risks. Historically, Presidents typically have used veto threats to extract concessions related to the
legislation that is subject to the threat, not to influence senators on unrelated
matters, such as other bills or judicial appointments.301 Presidents who publicly threaten to veto popular legislation to win confirmation of a Supreme
Court nominee therefore may appear unprincipled, risk a public backlash, or
even prompt counterattacks by senators and House members who could
stall the President’s legislative agenda or block other nominees. Furthermore, as Rebecca Deen and Laura Arnold have observed, vetoes and veto
threats can make Presidents look weak because of their “inability to lead
Congress.”302 Moreover, frequent use of veto threats without actually vetoing legislation can undermine the effectiveness of veto threats as a credible
tool to “move the congressional majority toward the president’s preferred
position.”303 For those reasons, Presidents are unlikely to use veto threats
except as a last resort to get their most important (and embattled) nominees
confirmed.304
Yet commentators such as Eisgruber who hope that a resurgent Senate
can rein in Presidents who engage in ideologically driven selection should
not underestimate the impact of presidential veto threats in moving the Senate majority toward confirmation. A targeted veto-threat strategy might be
particularly effective in the judicial appointments context. Such a strategy
would focus on minor legislation that is of special importance to key members of the Senate but that is unlikely to actually “result in vetoes and inter-
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branch confrontation,”305 such as a spending provision that benefits the state
of a key senator but has no wider public saliency.306
Further, as Richard Conley has suggested, Presidents can help to insulate themselves from public and congressional repercussions by issuing private rather than public veto threats, because such threats often avoid “blame
game politics” and a showdown between the branches.307 Recent political
science research suggests that Presidents use private veto threats far more
often than previously thought. Indeed, Deen and Arnold estimated that
25% of the vetoes threatened during the presidency of Gerald Ford were
privately communicated to senators and not reported in the popular press.308
For George H.W. Bush, just under 20% of his veto threats were “purely
private,” while approximately 20% more fell into the “private-to-public”
category, which means that they were originally communicated privately to
senators but were later reported in the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report or on the AP wire.309 In his study, Conley found that private and private-to-public veto threats were “quite effective in winning concessions
from Congress” with respect to ordinary legislative measures, but the record
was mixed with regard to highly salient legislation.310 Meanwhile, only sixteen of the 205 veto threats during the George H.W. Bush Administration
failed to win the “policy concessions” sought by the White House,311 which
means that the use of veto threats can be a highly effective strategy in moving the congressional majority toward a President’s preferred policy positions.312
The use of logrolling and veto threats to win support for a Supreme
Court nominee is underexplored in the empirical literature. Research in the
context of ordinary legislation strongly suggests, however, that these tactics
could be effective in persuading recalcitrant senators to vote in favor of judicial nominees that they might otherwise oppose. Through logrolling and
305

See Conley, supra note 285, at 731. A targeted strategy also minimizes the risk of both angering
and provoking a counterattack by members of the House of Representatives, who are not involved in
consenting to judicial appointments.
306
For example, Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska felt so strongly about funding for a bridge to Gravina Island in Alaska, dubbed the “bridge to nowhere” by critics, that he threatened to quit the Senate if
his earmark was not approved. Editorial, A Bridge Too Far, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 2005, at A16. Presidents willing to get tough in the fight for a Supreme Court nominee could exploit such parochial interests through veto threats or logrolling strategies.
307
See Conley, supra note 285, at 731.
308
See id. at 733 (citing Deen & Arnold, supra note 285).
309
See id. at 735.
310
Id. at 739; see also id. at 741 (“Bush won more clear-cut compromises and concessions on much
ordinary legislation, including appropriation measures that were the focus of many of the private-topublic threats in the 102d Congress.”).
311
See id. at 743.
312
See CHARLES M. CAMERON, VETO BARGAINING: PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF NEGATIVE
POWER 193 (2000) (“Veto threats usually bring concessions.”); id. at 198 (“Presidential scholars have
long suspected that veto threats are a powerful tool for presidents.”).

1915

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

the judicious use of targeted and private veto threats, a President can forcefully push back against a Senate that attempts to “get tough” against Supreme Court nominees.

*

*

*

Our aim in describing these techniques—strategic selection, the bully
pulpit, recess appointments, and legislative tactics like logrolling and veto
threats—is not to claim that they will always be successful. Nor do we
mean to suggest that they will be used, or should be used, in particular circumstances. Rather, the availability of these techniques helps to explain
why the Senate has not followed the advice of scholars like Eisgruber to
block ideological or recalcitrant Supreme Court nominees, even though it
has begun to “get tough” with respect to nominations to the lower courts.
Senators cognizant of the President’s institutional strength and strategic options likely will think twice before escalating the conflict over a nominee in
all but the most compelling cases.
The President’s available arsenal also serves as an indication of how
ugly the Supreme Court appointments process could become if the Senate
chooses to “get tough.” The confirmation process for nominees to the circuit courts of appeals now involves extraordinary delays and acrimony,
with the President turning to recess appointments and the Senate using filibusters and other legislative tactics to stall judicial nominees.313 Importing
those features into the Supreme Court appointments process would have serious costs, and proponents of a “get tough” strategy by the Senate should
carefully consider the consequences.
CONCLUSION
In response to the new politics of judicial appointments, many commentators have proposed Senate-specific reforms, appealing to senators to
stand up to the President and block unacceptable nominees. In The Next
Justice, Christopher Eisgruber joins their ranks. He calls for the Senate to
“get smart” by asking penetrating questions about the judicial philosophy of
Supreme Court nominees in an effort to ensure that future Justices are moderates rather than extremists. He also proposes that the Senate “get tough”
by rejecting any nominees who do not prove to be moderate or who fail to
give satisfactory answers at their confirmation hearings. We have serious
reservations about the specifics of Eisgruber’s reforms, which are predicated on a questionable definition of a “moderate” and an incomplete diagnosis of the reasons behind the increasing politicization of the appointments
process. In particular, Eisgruber underestimates the influence of interest
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groups and the media, which create powerful pressure for senators to deliver ideological results.
All proposals that depend on effective resistance by the Senate must
also overcome the substantial institutional strength of the Presidency. A
rich political science literature demonstrates that a “get tough” strategy by
the Senate is likely to provoke a strong response from the President, who
has a number of tools available to deal with Senate resistance. The most
basic and powerful is the strategic selection of Supreme Court nominees,
especially those with excellent qualifications, which can make it difficult
for senators to delay or reject those nominees. In the face of an obstructionist Senate, Presidents can also draw upon their substantial institutional
strength by “going public” and touting the qualifications and attributes of
the nominee, by making or threatening a recess appointment, and by employing ordinary legislative techniques like logrolling strategies and credible veto threats. Strategic employment of these tactics makes it more
difficult for senators of either party to obstruct Supreme Court nominees
and, as a result, undermines the effectiveness of Senate-specific reforms to
the appointments process.
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